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Industrial parks are as popular as they are controversial, in 
India and globally. At their best they align infrastructure 
provision and agglomeration economies to jolt industrial 
growth. More often, they generate negative spill-overs, 
provide handouts, sit empty, or simply do not get built. 
This paper disaggregates how parks are built and how 
they fail. It contextualizes parks in India, followed by a 
thick case study of an innovative scheme that appears 
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to buck the trend. This performance is then explained 
by the way in which the scheme’s design and action 
fit India’s political economy. The paper concludes by 
considering how the analysis and the lessons learned 
might inform the design and implementation of 
industrial park programs and other public interventions, 
in India and elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION 
The theory of industrial parks is seductive. It holds that governments must provide public goods, 
particularly infrastructure, for industrial firms to be competitive; co-located firms generate 
agglomeration economies; and so the public goods should be concentrated on areas of colocation. If 
the firms are not there yet, the provision of infrastructure will somehow induce them to be. If the area 
is demarcated, and the general economic environment difficult, exemptions can be made that will 
further entice firms and create competitiveness (in this case making the parks what is most generally 
termed “Special Economic Zones”, or SEZs).1 
There are some cases where the practice has approached the theory. The most commonly cited cases 
are in East Asia, but parks also dot much of the developed world. Many question the true cost-benefit 
of such parks, though often with somewhat weak counterfactuals. 
In much of the developing world, though, the case is somewhat simpler. The practice is far enough 
from the theory for subtle arguments to be moot. Industrial park and SEZ programs are often rightly 
criticized for producing white elephants; eroding the tax base; creating vehicles for land speculation; 
delivering hand-outs to favoured firms; and funneling spending to favoured districts. That is if the 
parks are even completed in less than a decade. 
More than one of these failures has afflicted industrial park schemes in India over the last few 
decades. The instrument though has continued to grow in its use, if often rechristened as “cluster 
development” or using variations around the term “zones”. Many of the most high-profile programs 
have very mixed records, often delivering under-target, several years late and with low take-up. 
However, in the last few years a program has been developed and implemented in India, originated by 
the Ministry of Textiles, which seems to perform substantially better than the norm there. While 
results are still indicative, the scheme gets parks built; it guards against speculation and capture; the 
parks attract investment; and, in several cases, they show signs of generating real cluster effects. 
At the core of the scheme’s relative success are the details of its design, and the manner in which 
those details fit to the political economy of building parks in India. In particular the scheme keeps 
parks right-sized, neither too small nor too large; makes location and dimension decisions costly to 
those who make them (much more costly than forfeiting a consulting incentive fee); reduces the role 
of forecasts; places the burden of navigating local informal relationships on those best placed to do it; 
aligns roles and incentives; creates ‘soft’ infrastructure through the way it builds ‘hard’;2 and, from 
the outset, focuses the public sector and its hired consultants on catalyzing and monitoring groups of 
firms as owner-users, rather than initiating, designing or managing the parks. 
In the model, government grants are closely tied to areas where there are immediate gains from 
coordinated action: common infrastructure and facilities and sometimes more limited help with land. 
Firms which seek to gain access to support under the scheme need to cooperate on a number of 
immediate issues in order to access assistance. This builds agency that can lead to further 
externalities, whether through cooperation or “thick” markets such as for machinery and labor. This 
does not, however, work automatically: the effect requires a close fit between the incentives created 
                                                     
1 The term “SEZ” can sometimes be used by policy-makers with a specific meaning as regards the regulatory and other 
(mostly tax-related) exemptions provided, but it is considered the most generic term in the literature for parks providing any 
type of regulatory exemptions, and therefore was used as such here. 
2 “Hard” refers to physical infrastructure, such as roads, rail and power, and the operational systems required for it to 
operate. “Soft” refers to social infrastructure, such as organizations for collective action, firm capabilities, skills, health 
services, cultural preservation, and so forth. 
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and the political and entrepreneurial context. It required substantial early work by the lead Ministry 
and its advisors to identify firms capable of leading this process among their peers, though once a 
demonstration effect had been created they were able to switch to a heavy focus on monitoring. 
The study does not begin to claim that the scheme is a panacea. It remains early days, even if the signs 
are encouraging. In particular, though the scheme seems to be generating forms of cluster 
organization, it could experiment with doing more to capitalize on these and generate agglomeration 
economies quicker. The first wave of parks, now reaching operational mass, might be fertile grounds 
for such repeat experiments. 
However, this is not a model which can be understood simply. Its performance is not uni-causal and 
its features are complex and deeply related to its context, in particular its local political economy, 
industry structures and firm capabilities. The scheme depends on the existence of a base of firms with 
the financial means to participate in park building (typically requiring $44,000 in equity) and more 
importantly with the management capabilities to at least initiate self-organization. It requires at least 
some “leader” firms, with the ability to recognize the value of common organization, and estimate 
that it outweighs the risks of free-riding and delays by “follower” firms, who themselves may join for 
more near-term instrumental benefits, such as reducing the transaction costs of obtaining sufficient 
land and scale in local infrastructural services. In turn though, this creates a risk of such leader firms, 
if large or able to wield substantial influence, turning this organization into a vehicle of capture. The 
fragmented nature of the textile industry in India likely mitigates this risk, but this may not hold if the 
scheme is “pushed” too quickly into other sectors or contexts. 
Attempting a superficial replication is then likely to lead to one or more forms of failure, including 
creating the scope for corruption and collusion (and there are some signs that, even in India, the 
scheme is being “pushed” into sectors where it may not be appropriate). However, this does not mean 
there is no scope for learning, and it is our belief that there are a range of environments in which this 
scheme may have useful features. Nevertheless, this paper does not attempt to present a best practice 
for implementing industrial parks. It attempts to deepen our knowledge of how and why industrial 
parks fail, and how schemes can sometimes be designed in their detail, and implemented in practice, 
to avoid at least some types of failure. 
Perhaps most broadly, it attempts to delineate the type of questions which must be asked when 
designing the implementation of these and other industrial policy programs. These include: what are 
the precise steps involved in undertaking the intervention? What performance failures might arise as 
these are undertaken? Where might these steps, and these performance failures, intersect? Who is 
given responsibility for each step? How strong or weak are their incentives to avoid the performance 
failure? Are there others, capable of performing the step, with stronger incentives? What is the size of 
each discrete intervention, and how does it interact with the prevailing political settlement (how 
noticeable is it, and is that beneficial or harmful)? What ripple effects could there be on the long-term 
pressures for or against reform, by either strengthening or removing different voices? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the first section disaggregates the roles in 
building industrial parks, the types of failure witnessed in implementation, and relates these to each 
other. The second describes the model under consideration, and the third provides data on its results 
so far. The fourth considers tentative signs of agglomeration economies and positive and negative 
spillovers beyond the parks. Section five explains its performance by considering its alignment of 
formal and informal incentives and capabilities. Section six examines the challenges to scaling up and 
replicating the scheme. The paper then concludes with directions for further research and action. 
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I. INDUSTRIAL PARKS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The rationale for industrial parks has traditionally been twofold. First, the provision of functional 
infrastructure is much easier to plan in a geographically limited space, particularly for delivery-
constrained governments. 3 Second, the concentration of firms can provide significant spillover effects 
both inside and outside the park4: information spillovers, including knowledge and technology; the 
specialization and division of labor among enterprises; the development of skilled labor markets; and 
the development of markets around the parks.5 
The general type of an industrial park is a concentrated set of firms operating on a demarcated ‘hard' 
infrastructure platform. Beyond this, a number of different forms have been developed. Most involve 
additional regulatory features, often to bypass unsupportive business environments, facilitated by the 
“limited” area involved, in which case the umbrella term is “Special Economic Zones” (SEZs). Such 
variations include: “tax” parks (which provide tax benefits); technology parks; “green” parks; “export 
processing zones”; and many others. In this paper, “industrial park” will be used in its most general 
sense, i.e., involving the provision of common infrastructure to a group of industrial firms in a 
demarcated area, while forms involving additional regulatory or other measures will be specifically 
denoted as such. 
In whichever variant, industrial parks in theory are a tool to develop a more general form of industrial 
organization: industrial “clusters”, a concentration of interconnected firms in a particular field. Such 
clusters can form “organically”, or can be the target of deliberate policies.6 The pursuit of active 
cluster development, like that of industrial parks themselves, can be a controversial policy goal. On 
the one hand, the growth of industrial clusters is frequently cited as a driver of China’s rapid growth. 
Many emerged spontaneously, but government (especially local government) also provided crucial 
support for their development. 7 
On the other hand, cluster development, and industrial park and zone programs in particular, have also 
been subject to significant criticism. There have been controversies regarding land allocated for their 
construction, sometimes at large scale, especially when parks are long delayed or scarcely occupied, 
fueling accusations of land speculation. It has also proven difficult to demonstrate additionality, i.e. 
that the activity in parks would not have happened without their construction and the public money 
that has been spent to support it. This latter criticism has been strongest for policies that not only 
provide public money for park construction but forego revenues in the form of taxes or resort to 
specific regulations such as looser labor laws to attract investment. 
Yet the criticisms seem to have had little to no impact on practice. Whether or not one side or the 
other of the general debate is correct, park and zone programs continue to proliferate, and many 
continue to under-deliver. To take just a few examples, many parks in Central America have eroded 
the tax base there; in Africa, industrial parks are often known to stand mostly empty even after many 
years; and a number of industrial parks in Afghanistan supported by various donors either did not 
                                                     
3 Marshall, A. (1920). Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. 
4 This review builds on previous writings by Douglas Zhihua Zeng (2006, 2010, 2011).  
5 Sonobe, Tetushi, & Otsuka, K..(2006). Cluster-Based Industrial Development: An East Asian Model. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
6 World Bank. (2010). Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute; 
Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press; Schmitz, H. (1995). “Small Shoemakers 
and Fordist Giants: Tale of a Supercluster.” World Development 23 (1): 9–28.. 
7 Ganne, B., & Lecler, Y., eds. (2009). Asian Industrial Clusters, Global Competitiveness and New Policy Initiatives. 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 
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become operational or failed to attract demand. Yet a glance at pipelines of development programs 
across continents finds no slackening in the creation of new industrial park programs.8 Since the 
available evidence strongly suggests this will continue, there are likely more gains in understanding 
how and why park programs do or do not deliver than in attempting to frame a general law of their 
merits. 
These general characteristics apply strongly to the Indian context. For decades state-level industrial 
development corporations have been building industrial parks. At the center, multiple ministries and 
plan periods have framed new industrial park schemes. The most visible recent attempt was the SEZ 
program, launched in 2005, which stumbled in implementation.9 Many examples of successful parks 
have been built in India, through both center and state initiatives, but the overall record is decidedly 
mixed, and timelines tend to be long and lengthening (as will be described in more detail below). 10 
Several factors are often posited to explain the failures of industrial park programs. Some are highly 
specific, such as the threat of conflict, but most are broad, for example, poor sector targeting; poor 
location choice; insufficient investment in infrastructure; poor implementation capacity and lack of 
authority; and lack of high-level support and stability.11 When these are surmounted, or sidestepped, 
relative failure is also attributed to factors such as a lack of support for technology acquisition, skills 
building and quality assurance, or other actions that would generate “cluster effects”.12  
Such diagnostics focus on the absence of particular institutional forms, rather than the functions that 
should be served by the different stakeholders.13 This runs this risk of building in “strong priors about 
the nature of the problem and the appropriate fixes”,14 and can stand in the way of finding solutions in 
terms of performance. We therefore find it more useful to classify implementation failures of 
industrial parks into four main performance categories:  
(i) the parks do not get built;  
(ii) the parks are built but there is little demand from firms to locate and invest in them; 
(iii) the parks are built and generate demand, but with few “cluster effects”;  
(iv) the parks are successful but have neutral or negative side-effects on investment climate 
outside the park (“negative spillovers” and “crowding out”).15 
Two important points must be made on this classification. First, categories (i) and (ii) relate to 
performance failures in terms of outputs, while (iii) and (iv) relate more to outcomes. The underlying 
causes affecting park building (i) and investment attraction into them (ii) are very different from those 
affecting the development of clustering externalities (iii) on the one hand and the provision of local 
public goods (iv) on the other. It is still early stage for the scheme examined here to provide a formal 
                                                     
8 For example, in a recent analysis of the WB CI Practice affiliate’s desire for knowledge by topic, the largest unmet demand 
for knowledge related to parks and zones. The authors are personally aware of park programs recently formulated or in 
development in countries ranging from Ethiopia to Brazil to Myanmar to Afghanistan. 
9 World Bank (2012), “Learning from SEZs in India”, Unpublished. 
10 Farole, T.,, and Akinci, G., eds. (2011). Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging Challenges, and Future Directions. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
11 Dinh, H.T. et al. (2012). Light Manufacturing in Africa: Targeted Policies to Enhance Private Investment and Create Jobs. 
Africa Development Forum Series. Agence Française de Développement and The World Bank. 
12 Zeng, D.Z. (2006). Knowledge, Technology and Cluster-based Growth in Africa: Findings from Eleven Case Studies of 
Enterprise Clusters in Africa. Knowledge for Development (K4D) Program, World Bank Institute, The  W orld B ank. 
13  Blum, J., Manning, N. & Srivastava, V. (2012). Public Sector Management Reform: Toward a Problem-Solving 
Approach. Economic Premise, Number 100, December 2012. The World Bank. 
14 Rodrik, D. (2008). The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn? Cambridge, MA: 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
15 What we term “cluster effects” and “negative spillovers” are explained in detail in section IV. 
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evaluation of the last two failures, and hence to make definitive statements about outcomes. As such, 
the study is principally focused on outputs, as these are necessary, if not sufficient for outcomes, and 
it is precisely the production of these outputs which has proven difficult and elusive (as discussed 
further below). Therefore the focus of this study is on evaluating how and why a scheme has managed 
to perform at getting parks built and attracting demand for them. However, the scheme’s potential in 
avoiding failure types (iii) and (iv) is explored, and areas of focus for a future evaluation identified. 
Second, the ordering above is time-wise. In particular, the opportunity cost of (i): not getting the parks 
built, and therefore probably not spending all the public money that was committed, could be lower 
than the opportunity cost of (iv): successful parks but with negative side-effects (such as tax erosion, 
or diminished pressure for reform, discussed below), if those side-effects are large enough. However, 
there is not an a priori ranking of the opportunity costs of the failures, because of the variation in the 
size and configuration of schemes. A very large “white elephant”, whether built and empty or 
absorbing human and political capital and financial commitments (if not disbursals) for years, could 
have a larger opportunity cost than a moderate park with minor external effects. 
These performance failures can be related to the process of building and operating industrial parks, 
the stakeholders involved and the functions they have been assigned. The steps in the process can be 
broadly enumerated as: (1) identification of park location; (2) identification of potential demand and 
overall dimensions; (3) procurement of land; (4) design and dimensioning (“master planning”) within 
the park; (5) financing and financial structuring and planning; (6) procurement of infrastructure 
building; (7) construction of infrastructure; (8) operation & maintenance; and (9) monitoring and 
evaluation.  
These roles have been shared in many different ways between national, sub-national and local levels 
of government, and as many as four types of private sector firms: consultants hired by the government 
for demand identification, and/or designing and financing of the parks; “developers” who typically 
prepare the master plan for the parks; hired “constructors” and “operators” who construct the parks 
and manage their operation and maintenance (i.e., who follow more than make decisions); and 
“users”, i.e. the private entrepreneurs occupying the park themselves. In this light, it is of limited use 
to call an industrial park delivery model “private sector driven” or “public-private” as soon as the 
private sector is “involved”. With a large number of process steps and roles, the critical questions are: 
Who does the “private sector” refer to (real estate developers, consultants, users)? And, what steps 
will they undertake?  
In this light, the pertinent question for a park scheme is how the choice of a certain part of the public 
or private sector to implement these steps increases or decreases the possibility for such failures. The 
phrases “private sector” or “PPP” need to be used carefully. Often, this implies private sector 
involvement primarily in the later steps of internal dimensioning (4); infrastructure construction (7) 
and park operation & maintenance (8), whereas the more crucial location selection (1), and demand 
identification and overall dimensioning (2) are predominantly, if not exclusively, taken on by a public 
entity. Even if this entity is supported by a technical consultancy, client-consultant agency and 
conflict of interest problems mean such steps may be de facto public and very often political. 
Moreover, the “private sector” is heterogenous. The incentives and costs facing a consultant, a 
developer and the users of the park are very different, as is their situation – formal and informal – 
within the local political economy. It is important to caution against the prior assumption that “the 
private sector” will be better at all steps. Whether this is so, and who is meant by the “private sector”, 
will depend on specific capabilities and incentives. The design of industrial park programs should 
consider each of these steps, and seek to understand, in the light of the local political economy, which 
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actors would be better or worse suited to which roles. Among the conjectures we will explore below is 
that such “role allocation” is the most important parameter for park implementation. 
To illustrate, Table 1 provides an indication of how the different functions or steps enumerated above 
might hypothetically map with the different types of failures mentioned earlier in some instances. 
Table 2 gives an example of the mapping of actors with implementation steps in a typical “public-
private partnership” model, showing the limited role played by the users/entrepreneurs, which will 
become a central point of the discussion below. 
Table 1: Steps in industrial park development and potential failures  
Function vs. 
Failures 
(i) Park does not 
get built 
(ii) Not enough 
demand 
(iii) Limited cluster 
effects 
(iv) Negative 
spillovers 
(1) Location 
selection  X X  
(2) Demand 
identification   X X  
(3) Land 
procurement X X  X 
(4) Design & 
dimensioning X X X X 
(5) Financing and 
structuring X  X  
(6) Infrastructure 
procurement X    
(7) Infrastructure 
construction X    
(8) Operation & 
maintenance  X X  
(9) Monitoring & 
evaluation (M&E) X   X 
Table 2: Example mapping of stakeholders and responsibilities 
Steps vs. 
Stakeholders 
Government / 
public agency 
Private       
consultancy 
Private 
developer 
Pvt construction / 
operation firm 
Park users 
(firms) 
(1) Location 
selection X     
(2) Demand 
identification  X X    
(3) Land 
procurement X     
(4) Design & 
dimensioning X X X   
(5) Financing and 
structuring X X    
(6) Infrastructure 
procurement   X   
(7) Infrastructure 
construction    X X 
(8) Operation & 
maintenance    X X 
(9) M&E X     
10 
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SITP MODEL IN INDIA 
The Scheme for Integrated Textile Parks (SITP) was inaugurated in 2005 by the Ministry of Textiles 
(MoT) of the Government of India (GoI). The objective was to create “world class infrastructure” for 
the industry and create “new textile parks of international standards at potential growth centers” to 
realize the full potential of the Indian textile sector.  
The SITP’s most prominent innovation is the far greater, and far earlier, role it gives to the users of 
the park. In contrast to almost all other schemes the authors are aware of, the roles of the Centre and 
State are diminished, consultants are used quite differently than in common practice, and third-party 
developers are conspicuous by their absence. The former two concentrate on organizing, supporting 
and monitoring groups of firms, who must then navigate the formal and informal requirements for 
getting the park built. 
In terms of specific roles, the MoT aimed to provide a robust implementation and funding framework, 
but then to delegate actual implementation and focus on monitoring. The entrepreneurs who will use 
the park are first required to organize themselves by forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The 
SPV then selects a specialized Project Management Consultant (PMC) from a list empanelled by the 
MoT and under a standardized Terms of Reference (ToR) supplied by the Ministry, to prepare a 
Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the MoT.16 How the choice from the list is made is left to the SPV 
members’ discretion.  
The SPV is then provided with a partial grant for the construction and operation of the park, for which 
they are also required to contract a PMC, though at this point it does not have to be chosen from the 
MoT panel. In practice, this PMC (the “SPV-PMC”), chosen for the execution of the park, is usually 
the same as the “MoT-PMC” which prepared the DPR and later provides advisory services to the 
MoT.17 For simplicity, we will therefore restrict our attention to this case in the remainder.  
In more detail, the policy makes the entrepreneurs the drivers and ultimate decision-makers of the 
entire initiative for the creation and functioning of the park, but with support from the PMC across the 
steps of industrial park development. The PMCs are required to possess “considerable infrastructure 
development experience”, for “speedy implementation of the project”. The bar to be an empanelled 
PMC is high: as of 2012, only seven PMCs had been empanelled, across India.18 Project structuring, 
feasibility study and costing of all aspects of the project are done by the PMC, according to decisions 
made by the SPV, which has the responsibility to define its needs and make final decisions on 
location, project design and costing. When complete, the PMC transmits the DPR for appraisal to a 
Project Scrutiny Committee (PSC) headed by the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Textiles. If 
passed, the project is submitted for approval to a Project Approval Committee (PAC), headed by the 
Minister of Textiles. 
If the project is approved, the central government then contributes a significant share of the funds for 
common infrastructure, and the SPV finances the rest. This contribution is up to 40% of the total or 40 
crores (~$8m), whichever is lower, as “grant-in-aid”, i.e. this does not constitute equity in the SPV. 
SPVs have the possibility to solicit States and state/locally-affiliated bodies such as Industrial 
                                                     
16  Empanelled PMCs as of 27 March 2012 were Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited – Cluster 
Development Initiative (IL&FS-CDI), ICICI Winfra; Industrial Consultants; CS Architects; Kushal Global-Pearl Academy 
of Fashion;.Technopark Advisors; and Magus Consulting 
17 IL&FS-CDI, the largest PMC on the MoT panel by number of parks managed (80%), says they have played both advisory 
and execution roles in 80% of the parks they manage, and that the ratio was similar for parks managed by other PMCs. 
18 The policy is now being revised and a new panel will be chosen. 
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Development Corporations (IDCs) for additional contributions to finance their 60% share, for 
example under State-funded schemes. State/local contributions can also be under the form of 
subsidized land or other benefits. PMCs may also invest in the SPV’s equity, if interested and 
requested by the entrepreneurs.19  
However these additional sources of financing are subject to the SPV members contributing at least 
51% of the equity, so that they retain managerial control. There is a limit of 20% of ownership for any 
single private entity within the cluster, so that there is no legally dominant firm, 20 and the land area 
occupied in the park must also be proportional to the equity contribution. The MoT initially provided 
a guideline of approximately 50 members per park, but has since allowed some flexibility by 
providing a matrix of the additional investment expected per entrepreneur when the number is lower. 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the basic SITP scheme structure and grant financing, while Figure 2 
highlights potential state and other contributions. 
 
Figure 1: SITP design and grant structure 
 
                                                     
19  IL&FS has participated in the equity in two parks, the Palladam Hi-Tech Weaving park in Tamil Nadu, and the 
Pochampally Handloom Park in Andhra Pradesh. 
20 20% is the legal threshold for giving key decision powers to an equity holder, although the threshold was not explicitly 
mentioned in the policy document and it was not clear if it could be circumvented by the use of two legal entities of the same 
group. 
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Figure 2: State and other bodies’ contributions 
 
 
To raise funds for the SPV’s share of costs, the PMC supports the SPV to structure and obtain 
financing, most often securing term loans for 40% of the costs by using common assets as collateral. 
Financial innovations may be used to facilitate securing the loan, such as including a 6-month debt 
repayment fund, 21 or having reimbursements made individually, despite the debt being raised in 
common through the SPV, to limit free riding22. This leaves approximately 20% of the costs as the 
equity portion of funding, to come in the most part as equity from the parks’ users. 
Project costs, as described by one of the PMCs, include: land purchase and site development23; 
common infrastructure (roads, water supply, storm water drain, power provision, etc.); factory 
buildings; common facilities (lab, training center, etc.); engineering fees (for engineering design); and 
pre-operative costs (depending on components, and usually around 5% of costs). Factory buildings 
are eligible for grants only if built and owned by the SPV, and not by individual firms in the cluster. 
The latter option is most common when firms in the cluster are heterogeneous. If firms are more 
homogenous, there can be large cost savings and added flexibility by building identical factories. This 
might have implications for the fitness of the model to different types of industries, due to the level of 
homogeneity in firms’ processes. For example spinning or weaving parks would typically be 
homogenous, as opposed to garmenting parks, and the conjecture is that the scheme structure might 
favour the former type, in terms of project costs and/or completion time. We do not have enough data 
                                                     
21 The debt repayment fund is effectively a debt service reserve account that allows the SPV to sustain up to 6 months of 
non-repayment of the loan, for example in the case of a liquidity crunch, before defaulting on the loan (which would trigger 
the seizure of assets by the lending institution). 
22 This innovation was described by IL&FS as originating from them and being unique among empanelled PMCs. 
23 Land is not eligible for the Central Government grant, but instead counted as equity contribution from the SPV, who is 
responsible for finding and buying it. 
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at this point to make such an analysis, but flag it for further research. Machinery is excluded from the 
costing of the project for the provision of grants, and is to be funded by individual units. 
During operations, the SPV charges its members monthly to recover the money from investments 
made and repay the debt. The level and structure of these charges are often designed by the PMC 
during project initiation. The largest PMC usually includes in the fees: maintenance charges; utility 
charges; infrastructure charges proportional to the area occupied; contributions to a sinking fund (in 
case of major repairs); and financial payments24. Figures 3a and 3b show diagrams of the debt 
financing mechanisms used and possibilities of financial structuring. Note that these financial 
structures are at the discretion of the users, PMCs and financial institutions. New financing models for 
the costs not funded by the grants do not require MoT sanction, encouraging innovation. 
Finally, project monitoring and evaluation are undertaken by the MoT, through the PMCs. The PMC 
is required to devise a “suitable monitoring and evaluation system” and must furnish “monthly 
reports/returns to the MoT” (samples available from the authors on request). The PMCs are paid a fee 
by the Ministry for their work (we consider the fee structure in Section V). 
 
Figure 3a: Typical debt financing structure 
 
                                                     
24 For example IL&FS suggests firms contribute around 10% of the monthly payment to a Common Debt Repayment 
Service Fund (CDRSF), to meet dues in case of default of a member. This solidarity mechanism typically allows the 
structure to survive temporary liquidity issues of a member, for example because of delays in getting payments from clients. 
The member is asked to replenish the fund when the situation normalizes. These innovations would be conditional of MoT 
review and approval at the Project Scrutiny stage. 
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Figure 3b: Alternative debt repayment mechanisms (innovation of PMC IL&FS) 
 
Comparing this model to the implementation framework developed above, the SPV, with the PMC, is 
involved in or has exclusive execution responsibility for all of the steps (1) through (8). The crucial 
decisions are costly to those who make them, who are also those with the thickest information about 
the local conditions needed to site the parks.  
Location selection (1) and land procurement (3) are supported by the PMC but decided and executed 
by the entrepreneurs themselves. By participating in the SPV the entrepreneurs make a costly signal 
of demand, providing robust demand identification (2), even if, as does occur, the government or the 
PMC initiates the process by approaching the entrepreneurs. Demand is therefore more or less actual, 
rather than potential or projected, before subsequent steps are triggered. Dimensioning (4), financing 
(5) and procurement are the responsibility of the PMC. Infrastructure provision (7) and O&M (8) are 
executed by specialized contractors, chosen by the SPV (though again with assistance from the PMC). 
Figure 4 illustrates a typical PMC’s involvement in the park development process. 
Two initial notes are important here on the capabilities of the firms involved, and on what the scheme 
offers to them. First, while the aggregate investment requirement from participating firms may seem 
large, it can and often is brought within range of a wide number of firms through the financing 
arrangements. Of the Rs 2 Cr (~$400k) average cost per firm, Rs 0.8 Cr (~$160k) are financed 
through grants, most often an additional Rs 0.8 Cr through bank loans and in many cases Rs 18 lakhs 
(~$36k) through state grants, leaving a still sizable but less stringent Rs 22 lakhs ($44k) to be paid 
directly as equity per firm. While substantial, this should be within range of a small to medium firm, 
for example in weaving being approximately the same cost as one to two modern autolooms.  
A more difficult requirement is likely to be that for the management capabilities to create and manage 
the SPV, including the ability to identify fellow firms and motivate them to join. This will be treated 
in more detail below, but the critical role here seems to be that of a “lead” firm (or firms), which see 
early the potential of the scheme for creating collective benefit, and which then identify other 
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“follower” firms to participate. These latter must be convinced to delay set-up or expansion plans and 
take part in a collective enterprise requiring a high degree of trust and a costly commitment of capital. 
Not only must such firms exist, but the scheme must offer to solve some problem they face which 
they find difficult to solve alone. While it is difficult to make definitive conclusions on this score, our 
conjecture is that the “lead” firms are motivated by the promise of cluster effects, and the “followers” 
of solving the small-scale infrastructure service and land purchase market failures endemic in India. 
This will be discussed at greater length below. 
Last, we make note of what the SITP does not offer. The Center provides no assistance in procuring 
land, while States may do so, but have tended not to, and have tended not to be asked (a topic 
discussed at more length below). SITP parks have no exceptional regulatory provisions and no 
ongoing fiscal subsidies to the firms as individual units or to the SPV. It funds only 40% of the cost of 
the parks’ infrastructure. In money and regulation, it is less generous to firms than most industrial 
park schemes, which should be borne in mind as we turn to consider its results. 
Figure 4: PMC project development process snapshot25
 
 
III. EARLY RESULTS: PARK COMPLETION AND DEMAND GENERATION 
Relative success in getting parks built 
To analyze the SITP’s results to date, data was obtained primarily from Infrastructure Leasing and 
Financial Services, Cluster Development Initiative (IL&FS-CDI, here simply referred to as IL&FS), 
following approval from the MoT26. IL&FS is the most active PMC27, with 32 projects currently 
                                                     
25 Modified from an IL&FS document 
26 A meeting with the Ministry of Textiles confirmed that using IL&FS data on their parks would be most efficient to 
conduct an analysis of the scheme. 
27 IL&FS is a limited company headquartered in Mumbai and with equity participations from Life insurance Corporation of 
India (25.9%), ORIX Corporation Japan (23.6%), Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (11.3%) and Housing Development 
Finance Corporation (10.7%), as well as the IL&FS Employees’ Welfare Trust (10.9%) and other smaller participations 
including from CBI and SBI. It started as a leasing company, then expanded into doing infrastructure PPPs. The creation of 
IL&FS-CDI, initially as an integral part of IL&FS and then as a separate (but 100%-owned) subsidiary, was triggered by the 
launch of the SITP scheme in 2005. 
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under management, of the 40 approved in the first round of the scheme. The data was complemented 
with field visits and interviews conducted at multiple sites in two states with among the largest 
number of parks (Gujarat and Tamil Nadu), as well as meetings with relevant state authorities and 
industry associations when possible (further details of field visits are available from the authors on 
request). 
The data provides a strong indication that type (i) implementation failures (parks not being built, or 
not in a timely manner) are largely being avoided under SITP. The scheme began in 2005 with a 
target of 25 parks, later extended to 40 parks because of high demand. By 2011, all 40 parks had been 
approved and had at least begun construction. By 2013, almost all were operational or close to being 
operational. Specifically, of the 40 parks, the breakdown of advancement as of October 2012 was as 
follows: 11 fully completed; 13 started commercial production; and 16 parks at various stages of 
construction. The list of parks and their basic characteristics is given in Exhibit 1 at the end of this 
paper. The time-wise approval of parks under SITP is as per Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Time-wise approval of textile parks under SITP 
Year of Approval Number of Parks 
FY 2005-2006 07 
FY 2006-2007 17 
FY 2007-2008 03 
FY 2008-2009 12 
FY 2009-2010 01 
TOTAL 40 
 
In terms of spatial location, the first wave of parks principally located in the western and southern 
states, particularly Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Few located in major 
cities, but most were set up in secondary cities with strong industrial clusters (such as Surat in 
Gujarat, or in the textile belt around Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu). This accords with recent studies 
finding a shift of industrialization in India to secondary cities, a development which is likely to have 
beneficial effects for the inclusiveness of growth.28 
Among IL&FS parks for which we have data, there is considerable variance in time-to-completion 
between projects. Most were completed or are expected to be completed within an average (and 
median) of around 6 years from approval time. The fastest has been completed in 3.9 years and the 
longest is expected to be completed in 9.1 years, and around 60% of parks have been completed or are 
expected to be completed in between 4.5 to 7 years. 
Moreover, 2 of the 32 projects managed by IL&FS have been cancelled. The cancellations occurred 
while the projects had disbursed only 30% of the planned MoT grants (corresponding to milestone 
two of five in a typical park timeline), and these projects had been approved during the most active 
approval year, in FY 2006-2007. Two other projects were cancelled among the 8 non-IL&FS parks, 
both after 10% of committed grants had been disbursed.29 But even adding those, this translates into a 
loss rate of less than 3% so far for what might be viewed as public grant “venture capital”. 
                                                     
28 Desmet, K., Ghani, E., O’Connell, S., & Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2012). The Spatial Development of India. Policy Research 
Working Paper. The World Bank. 
29 One was managed by SREI Capital Markets Ltd., the other by CS Architects Pvt. Ltd. Both were cancelled  
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In interviews the PMC attributed variation to the complexity of the project and the speed of obtaining 
clearances and financing. Environmental clearances in particular were said to lengthen completion 
time by approximately a year. What the data shows is a small positive correlation of average 
completion time with total cost, but no significant relationship was found with the size of businesses 
in the park (proxied by average land area per entrepreneur) or with the size of parks (in terms of land 
area). 
There was some variance across states, with Gujarat, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh faring best, and 
West Bengal worst. However, the statistical evidence is relatively weak given the small number of 
parks. Moreover, variations within states were at least as wide as those between states. For example in 
Tamil Nadu average completion time was close to the national average (6.7 years versus 6.4 years in 
the 32 IL&FS parks), but ranged from 4 to 9 years within the state. However controlling for states did 
not yield any additional significant results in terms of correlation between completion time and park 
attributes such as complexity (project cost), size (in acres) or the average size of businesses in the 
parks. Exhibit 2 summarizes this time-to-delivery data. 
While these gestation periods may seem long in some contexts, for industrial parks in India this pace 
of delivery is at the least respectable. There is a common perception that the speed of implementation, 
of “getting things done”, is a constraint on India’s growth, and long project timelines are common for 
general as well as industrial infrastructure.30 Moreover, there is some evidence that the early years of 
the program represented a natural learning period, as stakeholders adjusted to an innovative policy 
and its arrangements. With the stakeholder system having achieved learning by doing, there are some 
indications momentum is building. The policy will be extended commencing this year, and 45 
Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) are already on the Ministry’s table. The strongest evidence for the 
SITP’s ability to avoid type (i) and type (ii) failures, though, comes from a comparison with other 
industrial park schemes attempted in India in the last few years. 
First, and probably the highest profile such attempt, was the SEZ scheme. This was launched to much 
fanfare in 2005, with the passage of the SEZ Act. Being enacted by national legislation, with wide 
coverage, and widely supported by public land acquisition, it attracted vastly greater interest than the 
SITP: 580 SEZs have been approved, but only 380 notified (i.e., land has been acquired), and of those 
only 124 were operational at the time of writing, a conversion ratio of 21%. The vast majority of the 
operational SEZs were IT office parks. In manufacturing, only 44 non-IT SEZs were in operation in 
mid-2011. This is roughly comparable to SITP parks, despite the significant fiscal and regulatory 
advantages offered by SEZs, the much wider sectorial scope of the policy and the broad support it has 
received from both states and Centre (including again through cheap government land).31 Moreover, 
while SEZ approvals have been declining rapidly, and private sector interest waning, interest in SITP 
parks is only growing, despite the absence of tax breaks or similar instruments. Exhibit 3 summarizes 
comparative figures between realizations under the SEZ Act of 2005 and under SITP. 
Previous textile cluster schemes were also less successful than SITP, despite offering sometimes 
much higher levels of support. In those, the states or their agencies were responsible for most 
implementation steps, from location selection (1) to dimensioning (4), and from infrastructure 
provision (6) to park operation and maintenance (8), with monitoring (9) remaining mostly with the 
central government. TCIDS32, which offered assistance of 50% of costs capped at Rs. 20 crores, saw 
                                                     
30 12th Five-Year Plan, Government of India. 
31 World Bank (2012) 
32 Textile Centers Infrastructure Development Scheme 
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some projects being completed, i.e., somewhat avoided type (i) failure, but most were small and 
brownfield, and many were perceived to be subject to a type (ii) failure, i.e., lack of demand.  
A more recent scheme was APES (Apparel Parks for Exports Scheme). This targeted green field and 
larger parks. Location selection (1) was shared between state and center, dimensioning was pre-
decided at between 150 to 250 acres (4), and land provision was the explicit responsibility of state 
governments (3). Despite offering grants for 75% of infrastructure costs (vs. 40% under SITP), APES 
saw only 2 projects approved: one in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, where the industry association de facto 
took over implementation;33 and one in Ludhiana, Punjab, which took more than 10 years to develop. 
A similar pattern of results may be identified in other sectors. For example, the Ministry of Food 
Processing (MoFP) also had a cluster scheme, the Food Park Scheme (FPS), which was a centrally 
sponsored scheme, i.e., funding was flowing to the states that would then fund the scheme locally. 
The result was that financing (step 5) became even more problematic than when the Center was 
directly playing this role, leading to the failure to build parks at all (type (i) failure, and therefore all 
other types of failures). 
In contrast, another central scheme for industrial parks that has made similar design choices as the 
SITP has been widely perceived as effective at avoiding type (i) and type (ii) failures. Like SITP, the 
Industrial Infrastructure Upgradation Scheme (IIUS) requires compulsory formation of an SPV to 
drive the process and appointment of the equivalent of a PMC for all-encompassing support. IIUS can 
only be used for existing parks, i.e. brownfield projects, so the challenge may be lesser. In addition 
the IIUS only took on SITP-like features in 2009, so the case has been studied in less detail. However, 
the IIUS applies to any sector, not only textiles, which provides some support to the hypothesis that 
role selection is crucial in avoiding type (i) and type (ii) failures, whereas the sector to which this 
applies is much less relevant (with caveats explained below). Further details on IIUS are available 
from the authors on request. 
Early indications in firm demand, investment and jobs 
Returning to the SITP, the data indicates that parks are not only built but are realizing investment. 
Long-run target investment in the 40 parks is approximately Rs. 20,000 crores, or $4 billion.34 Among 
IL&FS parks35, current investment has already reached 38% of the final target. In absolute terms, 
current investments represent 4 times grant disbursals, which is twice the policy’s objective. Progress 
towards targets is not related to the average size of plots in the parks. This indicates the scheme has 
managed to spur extra private investment, beyond park infrastructure, across the SME size spectrum. 
Further, progress towards investment targets does seem positively related to additional grant 
disbursal, indicating that private and public investment are being sequenced together. Seven parks 
already show a ratio of private investment to public grants in line with the final targets. Exhibit 4 
provides detailed investment data and statistics, while Exhibit 5 shows the relationships between 
investment figures and ratios with the percentage of government grant released, park project costs, 
average plot size and target investment/grant ratios. 
                                                     
33 This park was part of the field visits conducted as part of the study, and several entrepreneurs were interviewed. 
34 This corresponds to around $2 million per entrepreneur per park on average, which might seem an ambitious target and if 
reached would mean the SMEs in the park would eventually graduate from being officially classified as “medium”. 
Reaching half that target would still be a considerable achievement and does not seem out of line with investment rates 
observed during field visits. 
35 Excluding the two parks cancelled among IL&FS ones, the sample analysed here 
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Job creation and production will lag investment, and so the data can give only limited indications at 
this stage. The program’s target is 300,000 jobs across all parks36, as well as 350,000 indirect jobs. 
This translates into a target of 230,000 direct jobs for the subset of parks managed by IL&FS. In those 
parks 42,000 jobs have already been created, or 19% of the end-state target, which is promising given 
most of the parks are only now commencing production. 
The crucial question remains whether (or how many) investments would have been made (and jobs 
created) in the absence of the policy and the public money spent, in other words, the question of 
“additionality”.37 This might be posed locally, i.e., whether local entrepreneurs would have expanded 
anyway, or nationally, e.g., if investments which appeared new locally resulted in fact from cross-
state raiding of firms. Unfortunately, the data available is insufficient to serve as a means to probe this 
question at the moment. The authors are not aware of an analytical technique that would yield a 
rigorous answer, even with a more complete dataset. As such, anecdotal evidence can, at this stage, 
only provide indications. In that regard, discussions with IL&FS and entrepreneurs suggest however 
that around two-thirds of capacity in the park is indeed additional. 
While there would be an incentive for them to report this, individual entrepreneurs indicated, under 
repeated probing, that they would not have expanded or created their firms without the scheme. Some 
were already active in upstream parts of the value chain, such as machine sales, and entered the 
downstream segments through a park they came to know. Others had existing sites which had reached 
capacity and for which they said they had been struggling to find suitable expansion space. The 
machines visually observed in the park were new or of recent vintage, from high-end capital goods 
producers in Europe and the Far East. This was noteworthy in the weaving segment in particular, 
since textile weaving in India is little mechanized versus comparator countries, an acknowledged 
constraint on the sector’s growth. 
Nevertheless, we are conscious this does not amount to proof that new investment would not have 
happened anyway, though it should be noted much of the investment, in both parks and machinery, 
took place in a period of falling macroeconomic investment rates, particularly in manufacturing. 
Private investment growth fell 6.2 percentage points and manufacturing growth 11.8 percentage 
points in the period38. In the same timeframe the textiles sector was widely reported to be undergoing 
difficulties, with reports of rising defaults and struggling exports. 
In terms of public-private investment ratios, early indications are that the grants are relatively 
efficient. Rs. 7.4 lakhs (~ USD 15k) have been disbursed so far per job created in IL&FS parks 
(though no jobs have been created yet in 7 of these 30 parks), and, if the final targets are met, the final 
cost would be Rs. 1.1 lakhs (~ USD 2k) per job. Similarly, if the targets are achieved labor 
productivity in the IL&FS parks would be Rs. 20.3 lakhs (~ USD 40k), compared with estimates of 
approximately Rs. 1.2 lakhs for the Indian textile & garment sector in 2005-2006, the most recent 
figures available.39 While, as mentioned above, the parks seem on track to meet their jobs targets, the 
current absence of production data prevents an analysis of whether the productivity targets are 
similarly in reach. One interesting observation is the especially high productivity target for Gujarat 
                                                     
36 The approximation remains the same whether the 2 IL&FS parks cancelled are not accounted for or not 
37 Formally, transfers of capacity into the parks are forbidden. 
38 Authors calculations from World Bank and OECD national accounts data for the period from fiscal year 2005/2006 to 
fiscal year 2011/20112. Private investment is measured as private gross capital formation in current rupees (the data was not 
available in constant rupees), while manufacturing growth is measured in constant rupees with base year 2004/2005. 
39  Economic Services Group, National Productivity Council (2010). Productivity & Competitiveness of Indian 
Manufacturing Sector: Textiles & Garments. Report submitted to the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council, 
Government of India. 
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parks (Rs. 42 lakhs per job on average, more than twice the average target), in line with high capital 
intensity of Gujarat’s economy, and the comparatively low number for Andhra Pradesh (Rs. 8 lakhs 
per job) which accounts for a large number of the jobs to be created, but which also comprises the two 
largest park projects. Exhibit 6 summarizes employment, production, grant efficiency and related data 
for IL&FS parks. 
Of course, translating current trends to meeting targets requires sustaining demand beyond the first 
wave of entrepreneurs’ investments. While early demand generation required substantial marketing by 
the government and PMCs, the apparent success of the scheme has had a strong demonstration effect 
and the scheme now faces excess demand, as evidenced by the number of EoIs and DPRs for the next 
phase of the scheme. Moreover, while the early parks were concentrated in States that have 
historically had more developed textiles industries, the next phase looks set to achieve a broader 
coverage (Table 4 below), though the impact of this may be reduced if it results in cross-state raiding. 
Overall, allowing the scheme to succeed first in states with initial advantages has facilitated rather 
than held back the later spread of the scheme to lower-income areas. 
Table 4: State-wise approval of textile parks under SITP, by phase 
State 
Number of Parks 
approved in the first 
phase (2005-2010) 
Number of Parks 
approved in the second 
phase (2005-2010) 
Total 
Andhra Pradesh 5 2 7 
Gujarat 7 1 8 
Himachal Pradesh - 1 1 
Jammu and Kashmir - 1 1 
Karnataka 1 1 2 
Madhya Pradesh 1 - 1 
Maharashtra 9 6 15 
Punjab 3 - 3 
Rajasthan 5 4 9 
Tamil Nadu 8 2 10 
Tripura - 1 1 
Uttar Pradesh - 1 1 
West Bengal 1 1 2 
Total 40 21 61 
 
IV. EARLY RESULTS: CLUSTER EFFECTS AND POLICY SPILLOVERS 
The previous section analyzed data on SITP performance to date in avoiding failures of types (i) and 
(ii), in the failure framework presented above. This section presents the suggestive but consistent 
evidence gathered in the field and inferred from available data on whether the scheme is avoiding 
pitfall (iii) (lack of cluster effects or agglomeration economies). It also discusses the potential for, and 
safeguards against, pitfall (iv): negative spillovers or side-effects. 
Agglomeration economies 
There have been suggestive indications of scale efficiencies in “hard” inputs, though across some 
parks and not others. The first of these relates to environmental compliance. Since the cost of 
Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETP) can be included in project costing, some entrepreneurs 
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indicated that, together with scale economies, it had altered the balance between the cost of 
complying with pollution regulations, versus the risk-adjusted cost of being caught.40  
The several CETPs visited in SITP parks in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu were all of high standards, with 
advanced effluent monitoring and testing facilities, surveillance cameras on all critical effluent 
circulation and discharge areas and usually a complementary solid waste treatment facility. This could 
be contrasted with the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF)’s CETP scheme, which also 
provides grants for CETPs, but on a more traditional model requiring multiple State and Centre 
clearances and interventions.41 As such, it has had relatively limited uptake and has shown limitations 
in encouraging the building and maintenance of modern, efficient facilities.42 
Second, electricity access, a perennial issue for manufacturers in most parts of India, was more easily 
alleviated by interacting with the State government through the SPV structure, and with the 
cumulative “weight” of entrepreneurs in the parks in terms of employment and taxes. This was 
observed, for example, in Tamil Nadu, where electricity shortfalls were relatively more acute than in 
other states. There all of the SITP parks visited had managed to negotiate with the local distribution 
agencies a dedicated power distribution station and specific power agreements (however, this does 
raise a risk of negative distortions, which will be discussed further below). In other areas the support 
of PMCs was again important in terms of providing technical advice to SPVs, for example those 
which decided to set up their own captive power plant (as in two of the SITP parks in Gujarat). 
Turning to the effects of park implementation on “soft” infrastructure, there is some evidence that 
cohesion between entrepreneurs has been nurtured in the parks, with particular effects for self-
resilience. The principal reasons parks could still fail after being built and filled include: lack of 
proper maintenance; entrepreneurs finding a way to pocket the grant money and leave; or a lack of 
flexibility for transfer of ownership in case an entrepreneur leaves. The first is unlikely given the 
SPV’s structure. On that, and on the second, interviews suggested that the significant amount of 
money already invested by each entrepreneur in the park (through the SPV and individual investments 
already made) was a sufficient incentive to keep effort levels high and prevent fleeing. 
In interviews it was also consistently mentioned that entrepreneurs facing difficulties benefited from 
joint support, from the indirect effects of the park’s financial structure, and as importantly from 
mentorship and other forms of assistance from more capable members. While there might be a risk of 
this allowing inefficient firms to survive, the instruments seemed more targeted at temporary, 
liquidity-type issues (such as in the case of late payment of a large order). Further, the other members 
would have a strong incentive not to maintain low performing firms in the park, due to the damage it 
could do to the reputation, cohesion and financial health of the SPV. Barriers to exit might then be 
problematic, but several parks reported that they had some form of flexibility to sell the shells of 
entrepreneurs and to transfer SPV memberships (and one had already done so). 
Access to and cost of finance were said to have improved thanks to the pooling and credibility effect 
of the SPV structure, and the support received from PMCs on designing business plans and 
                                                     
40 Although this was not true for dyeing and processing in Tamil Nadu where the requirement for expensive Zero Liquid 
Discharge (ZLD) still made it prohibitive for the most polluting industries such as processing to comply, even within a park. 
41 The IIUS, mentioned earlier, can also be used to fund CETPs, though only in existing industrial parks, and now uses an 
SITP-like design. 
42 The conclusions of the most recent report of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) of the MoEF can be found at: 
http://www.cpcb.nic.in/statusCETP.php. The MoEF has acknowledged the deficiencies and the CETP scheme is now being 
modified for the 12th Five-Year Plan to require more SITP-like features such as constitution of an SPV for the users, though 
it retains a large role for States, especially on funding and land acquisition. The revised policy can be found at: 
http://envfor.nic.in/downloads/public-information/revised-cetp.pdf 
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structuring the financing.43 Though bank financing still remained a difficult process, it was perceived 
that the scheme had made it possible where it was not before, and the support from PMCs was seen as 
particularly important for small to medium size firm entrepreneurs, most of whom lacked adequate 
financial skills and wanted to “focus on their business”. 
Further, entrepreneurs in all the parks visited said grouping with peers had given them the confidence 
to invest more for expansion and upgrade. As mentioned above, machines in the parks visited were 
mostly recent or new ones, and even in the most modest units of the medium-sized Palladam weaving 
park in Tamil Nadu were highly automatized, high-quality ones originating mostly from Europe or 
Japan. From the interviews conducted, this investment behavior seemed likely due to the “risk-
pooling” effect of regrouping in the parks, e.g. the ability to share or delegate job work or even sell or 
buy machines from “neighbours”. The sharing of knowledge among entrepreneurs was also evident, 
and might have worked among workers too through the presence of common training facilities. In 
some cases this has also prompted competitive poaching, with workers more easily reallocated to 
more efficient users, though other parks have attempted to prevent this.44 Branding may also have 
been made easier by the grouping into parks45, and with improved logistics has helped entrepreneurs 
access new markets, including internationally, especially in parks focusing on one specific part of the 
value chain (such as yarn in Surat, Gujarat, and weaving in Palladam, Tamil Nadu).  
However, these effects in particular have been highly variable. In some parks the entrepreneurs were 
proactive in pursuing initiatives such as common purchasing, common order bidding, and common 
marketing. In others, the entrepreneurs were more passive or reactive, and such initiatives were less 
advanced, in several parks being an expressed wish which had not been acted upon. 
Overall, there is uneven but substantial evidence that the scheme is generating agglomeration 
economies, though heterogeneously across parks. We postulate that some of these economies are 
driving the high investment/grant ratio observed, through increased risk-taking and modern machinery 
acquisition. If valid, agglomeration economies should also result in firms in the scheme substantially 
outperforming the rest of the sector in productivity, i.e., would result in meeting or at least 
approaching the scheme’s very ambitious productivity targets.  
However, the unevenness of these effects across parks indicates some scope to do more: the scheme, 
through the SPV and its tasks, brings disorganized firms into a coherent group, creating a “soft” 
platform which can be built upon (more so than when firms simply take up space in a park built by the 
state or by a developer). We will return to this theme below. 
Negative side-effects on investment climate outside the park (“negative spillovers” and 
“crowding out”) 
There remain the risks of type (iv) failures, negative externalities. The design of the SITP consciously 
attempts to avoid its parks becoming instruments of “fiscal wars” that result in a “race to the bottom” 
among neighboring states, the most common and easiest spotted form of negative spillover. There is, 
                                                     
43 See again how IL&FS helped resolve the issue of common repayment of loans, as mentioned in section III and illustrated 
in Figure 3b. 
44 A 2011 study by Grant Thortnton for FICCI mentions the case of one park member offering higher wages than others and 
disturbing less profitable members. To avoid conflict, in some Parks, members agreed upon a fixed salary to be offered to a 
new entrant for first six months and not to poach each others workers. 
45 These initiatives can benefit from the collaboration established with PMCs. For example, IL&FS has helped the SPVs it 
advises choose a specific brand name and logo for their park. 
23 
 
though, another kind of negative spillover, best understood through the interplay of “voice” and “exit” 
by firms, with respect to the business environment.46  
The “exit” of industries from a general, difficult economic environment into the “privileged”, but 
limited space of parks may tend to reduce their willingness to raise their “voice” (a costly action) to 
demand broad-based improvements (which would now only bring limited benefits). The effect may be 
strengthened if the first firms to take advantage of the opportunity to exit are the most capable of 
seeing and using government programs, and therefore perhaps the very firms that would be most 
effective in lobbying. If authorities are not naturally very sensitive to firms’ concerns, the result could 
be the stalling of broad-based reforms to improve the investment climate.  
This risk may be mitigated if firms can move easily between many parks; and authorities are sensitive 
to such movement; and firms in the park still depend on firms outside them. Then firms inside and 
outside the park may move if the environment around them is weak, forcing a response. But if any of 
these conditions do not hold, for example if the firms in the park source from each other or through 
dedicated imports, then the result may have been simply to remove the relatively more effective 
advocates of reform from the political landscape. 
Therefore the design of industrial park programs, including variants such as regulatory and tax zones, 
should be evaluated including these potential negative spillover effects. This may provide a word of 
caution regarding such zones: they provide a much higher degree of “exit”, since they typically offer, 
in addition to privileged infrastructure, lighter regulations across the board and large fiscal incentives.  
On the other hand, when successfully implemented and scaled up, such as in China, such zones might 
offer the possibility of moving between them, creating a “race to the top”. To our knowledge, this 
conjecture has not been the subject of a specific study, but finds support in a range of related work, 
for example on the pressures to learn how to use SEZs in the early reform period of the 1980s, and on 
the ‘point’ to ‘surface’ model of experimental governance, including its application to ‘science and 
technology’ parks.47 However, this conjecture depends on the way in which sub-national authorities 
there have been made sensitive to the exit from their province of high capability firms, and so have 
sought to use such zones to learn, rather than to provide an easy means to placate louder voices 
without undergoing more substantial reform efforts. This in turn depends on local governments’ 
heavy fiscal dependence on their local industrial bases.48 
In other words, because such governments fear exit and the parks are not sticky enough to preclude it, 
local governments are strongly incentivized both to make the parks effective and to learn from them. 
This may be contrasted with India, where one may speculate that the large-scale exit of India’s IT 
firms into SEZs over the previous three years has contributed to their diminishing pressure for broader 
reform. The authors are not aware of specific research that rigorously tests this hypothesis, though it 
has found anecdotal support in conversations with policy makers in India and may be a fruitful area 
for future research. 
In this regard, the SITP again provides some advantages, as it provides no regulatory exceptions. It 
promises to create a large number of parks, increasing the possibility of exit, though the SPV may 
create stickiness for one firm in its original park, at least in the early years. Most parks being of 
                                                     
46 Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Harvard 
University Press. 
47 On the early reform period, see Vogel, E. F. (2011). Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. For ‘point’ to ‘surface’, see Heilmann, S. (2008), “From local experiments to 
national policy: The origins of China's distinctive policy process”, The China Journal, 59:1-30. 
48 Byrd, W. A., & Lin, Q. (1990). China's rural industry: Structure, development, and reform. Oxford University Press. 
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moderate size (a point to which we return further below), their members are still dependent on the 
surrounding environment, and do not have an exit even from “trunk” infrastructure. 49  Financial 
support is significant, but still leaves most of the financing to be raised by the entrepreneurs 
themselves (whether it is through further grants, loans or equity), so they do not have full exit from 
the financial sector either. 
However, there may be a countervailing effect, which creates a long-term risk for the program’s 
impact. This risk is that firms in the parks become highly organized and efficient at obtaining 
preferential treatment, effectively turning the parks into instruments of lobbying and capture. There is 
even a risk that this is occurring, for example, in the Tamil Nadu parks’ ability to secure electricity. If 
in doing so they deprive more productive users of electricity, this would be a substantial negative 
externality. While this cannot be tested yet, it bears watching in the future, particularly as more parks 
become operational. 
More generally, as described above, the SPVs are a vehicle for collective action, often formed and led 
by highly capable firms. They could become too effective at local lobbying, resulting in capture of 
local schemes and increasing distortions in favor of the parks. On the one hand, this risk is inherent in 
all successful cluster development programs; on the other, the small size of the firms involved in this 
scheme may mitigate it. This in turn depends somewhat on the structure of the textile industry, and 
the size of the grants for the parks (treated further below). It is however another risk that needs 
watching, especially when adapting the scheme to other industries and contexts. For example, very 
large parks, or parks with very large firms, would create particular concern in this regard. 
Overall, the SITP encourages entrepreneurs to build a new mechanism for voice, through organization 
into the SPV, and their connection with the PMC. It is far too early to tell if these will be effective in 
generating positive rather than negative spillovers. On the whole, however, the balance of risks seems 
neutral to positive, as it does for type (iii) failures, and more favorable than more common schemes. 
V. EXPLAINING RESULTS: SITP DESIGN & THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IPs 
In sum, early data indicates the SITP has managed to avoid type (i) and type (ii) implementation 
failures (getting parks built and occupied), while providing some positive early signs on avoiding type 
(iii) and type (iv), generating cluster effects and avoiding negative spillovers. In this section we will 
attempt to understand this performance in terms of the mapping of implementation responsibilities (1 
to 9) to the various stakeholders, and how that interacts with the political economy in which the parks 
are built.  
Our principal contention is that the key achievements of the SITP design are to fit those roles to the 
incentive structure of that political economy so as to leverage existing but underused capacity (firms 
using the parks) as well as new capacities (PMCs), and to allow necessary flexibility while limiting 
the opportunities for collusion. This design created a latent potential which had to be triggered to 
become actual, through demonstration effects. That in turn was provided by the MoT and the first 
PMC’s focus on organizing capable firms, rather than organizing parks. 
Engagement process and entrepreneurs’ cohesion 
                                                     
49 Large, linear infrastructure, such as transmission lines, national highways, and freight railway. The presence of quality 
highways was explicitly mentioned as key to the viability of the projects in many cases, since it allowed locating parks far 
enough from the city to find land at a reasonable price, while allowing easy commute to it so as to benefit from 
agglomeration economies (including proximity to markets and to qualified labor). This has been justly pointed by one of our 
reviewers as encouraging the development of secondary cities, and therefore also putting additional pressure for planning 
their development. 
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The initial phase of the scheme involved intense prospection on the part of the MoT and IL&FS-CDI, 
which had been chosen as sole PMC at the time. This engagement process was especially critical as 
the scheme was to rely heavily on the entrepreneurs and their ability to drive scheme implementation, 
from the very start. The objective was therefore to identify the entrepreneurs that had most demand 
and at the same time were most capable of organizing themselves to achieve that goal. The idea was 
to generate enough awareness in key dissemination points, and then let self-selection operate as 
willing and capable entrepreneurs would have an incentive to regroup and follow the most capable 
“leader”, while keeping less capable ones at bay. IL&FS explained that the most important quality of 
that entrepreneur was the ability to generate cohesion within the prospective SPV members. 
In practice the procedure was as follows. First, IL&FS and the Ministry would identify in which states 
the main “organic” clusters in the relevant sector were located (e.g. textiles for SITP), and within 
those states which were the principal industry associations and chambers of commerce. Next, they 
involved the local offices of the MoT and the state government’s Ministry of Industry. Together they 
would focus on key dissemination points (industry associations, chambers of commerce etc.) and 
make presentations of the scheme three or four times to different groups. There would always be a 
Project Manager (of an existing SITP park if any, or a prospective one) at presentations, who could 
later bring interested entrepreneurs to project sites to see the infrastructure and talk to entrepreneurs, if 
the park was already built. Finally the PMC would offer capacity building on what it takes to make a 
successful park to those among the prospective entrepreneurs who confirmed their interest. This 
capacity building would focus on the processes of organizing and coordinating within the cluster. 
This was clearly a time-intensive process. Here the PMC was vital. Since the PMC would only 
receive fees if entrepreneurs took up the scheme, and only if those were capable enough to 
successfully organize others, it had a strong incentive to find capable entrepreneurs and generate 
interest. Since the first PMC, IL&FS, had a long history of working with both Centre and State, and is 
partly government owned, it was well placed to be a trusted partner in the initial process, and to work 
the informal relationships needed among the various levels of government. At the same time, the 
importance of the textile industry in jobs and investment, as well as the need to find new solutions 
after prior schemes, likely played a role in the MoT’s drive to initiate the scheme, and State 
departments to cooperate in its launch. 
Once the scheme was visibly yielding results, excess demand in new parks allowed the MoT to avoid 
most of these efforts, except in some new, less advanced target states. Such excess demand has also 
provided some confidence in the selectivity of the engagement process with entrepreneurs, again the 
most crucial aspect of the scheme. On the other hand, it might be feared that the first entrepreneurs to 
take up the scheme were also the most capable, and therefore that SPV quality could deteriorate as the 
scheme expands. This will merit close monitoring.50 
The cluster effects observed in the previous section (the suggestive avoidance of pitfall (iii)) probably 
find their strongest spur in the initial cohesion-building exercise. This involves not just the initial 
formation of the SPV and initiative to apply for the scheme, but also the difficult process of selecting 
and purchasing land jointly – in practical terms but also financially, as the first grant installment is 
made only after monies to purchase land have been paid and the title obtained. This high “initiation 
                                                     
50 Another aspect to watch is the impact of location decisions on urbanization. There seems to be some evidence that 
industrial parks are spreading out to other cities, mostly secondary cities or other states, but not to any city or any other state. 
For example many projects were launched in Gujarat in the first phase, and much fewer in the current phase. The tension 
between agglomeration benefits and congestion costs (in particular land costs) for location choices has in fact been explicitly 
voiced by most of the entrepreneurs interviewed, in parks but also outside of them. For further discussion of this aspect of 
urbanization, see Ghani, et al. (2012). 
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cost” may have a positive effect on the willingness of entrepreneurs to keep organized to go through 
the rest of the difficulties of the park development process, possibly limiting free-riding.51 
Overall, though, it should be asked why firms would undergo the process in the first place. A general 
answer would point simply to the local failures of infrastructure provision in India, so that firms’ 
alternatives to set up may suffer high congestion costs. There is evidence that such costs are pushing 
firms in India to move out of urban areas earlier in the development process than in comparator 
countries,52 and in interviews this was often cited as a primary motivator for locating in a park. 
On the other hand, the parks only partly solve this constraint, given their continuing dependence on 
trunk infrastructure. As such, other factors must be at work. One conjecture is that the firms see the 
SPVs as ways to reduce the individual transaction costs of obtaining land, by pooling the formal and 
informal risks and costs of doing so.  
Several firms did report this as a benefit of the scheme which they valued. On the other hand, if this 
were paramount, we would expect to see fewer parks the better functioning were local land markets, 
and vice versa. In contrast, Gujarat, widely seen as having the least difficult industrial land market in 
India, has the most parks; and West Bengal, with a notoriously difficult environment for obtaining 
and converting land, has only one park, and that has taken the longest of all in the first wave to 
become operational. A more general comparison between states’ ratings on proxy indicators in Sub-
National Doing Business indicators for India, from 2009, and the number of parks, reveals a similar 
pattern: there are more, rather than fewer parks, in states with better-functioning land markets.  
So, while the limited data does not allow establishing significant relationships, it seems parks have 
been developed in greater numbers and fastest where there was a higher density of capable firms 
(Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat). On the other hand, there may be hidden threshold effects, so that 
the scheme is not effective at reducing costs in highly dysfunctional land markets, but is effective in 
moderately dysfunctional ones. 
More generally, we would return to the fact, mentioned above, that the participating firms are not 
homogenous, but may be distinguished between “lead” and “follower” firms. The scheme likely 
answers different needs for these different categories.  
Principally, it was clear to us that these “leaders” (and usually larger firms) had been motivated ex 
ante by the perceived advantages in clustering, and relatively less so by the subsidy and access to 
quality infrastructure (which they were more likely to be able to afford on their own). The “followers” 
that then joined were often smaller firms, relatively more attracted by the possibility to benefit from 
the initiative taken by the leaders, as well as the possibility to avail high quality infrastructure and 
obtain land for their own business at a relatively low cost. 
Roles and responsibilities 
We now turn to the incentive structure of the scheme. Its design creates a set of interdependences 
between the GoI, the MoT, states, PMCs and entrepreneurs (through SPVs). These are reinforced by 
institutional mechanisms such as regular monitoring reports sent by the PMC to the MoT; quarterly 
reviews of the overall scheme by an Apex inter-ministerial committee at the GoI level; and the 
appointment of directors on the SPV board by the MoT (through its local representatives), the PMC, 
                                                     
51 Hirschmann (1970). 
52 See, as well as Ghani et al (2012) above, an extensive literature including: Lall, S. V., Shalizi, Z., & Deichmann, U. 
(2004). Agglomeration economies and productivity in Indian industry. Journal of Development Economics, 73(2), 643-673, 
as well as the in-progress “India Urbanization Review: Nurturing Metropolitan Economies and Connecting Peri-urban 
Areas”, World Bank, New Delhi. 
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and the State. A simplified diagram of this structure is represented in Figure 5 below. We consider, in 
turn, how this structure fits the capabilities and incentives of each actor to their respective role. 
Figure 5: Simplified diagram of SITP incentive structure 
 
First, the central government is the main grant provider. In theory, despite not holding an absolute 
majority stake in the SPVs, it might be tempted to interfere in other aspects of project implementation. 
In some cases elsewhere, for example, political considerations have been known to induce sub-
optimal location selection. However, by virtue of India’s size and diversity, bureaucrats in central 
ministries have fewer incentives for such micro-targeting than State officials. The small size of the 
parks and the grants, in absolute terms, reinforce this bias, lowering incentives for location 
interference and increasing incentives for performance across all the parks. 
In terms of capabilities, a central ministry rarely has the capacity (both in terms of local knowledge 
and manpower) to monitor at a micro level, so the devolution to a specialized agency (the PMC) 
allows the MoT both to focus on its core strategic mission and to obtain better micro data. In this 
regard, the crucial instrument in the SITP policy is the clear Terms of Reference (ToRs) for PMCs, 
who must send monthly progress reports, with a uniform, simple format that helps the ministry take 
rapid decisions. Strict rules and methods for grant disbursements limit the abuse of funds in theory 
(though we discuss this at further length below). Samples of the utilization certificates that condition 
the release of installments of grant money are available from the authors on request, as well as 
samples of the grant sanction orders. 
Turning to the states, they can (and typically do) also participate in grant funding, but the limit on 
their participation in SPV funding is adapted to their lower funding capacity (compared to the Center) 
and somewhat limits grant wars between states.53 Therefore they have a limited direct role, in step (5), 
but together with their ability to appoint a director on the board of the SPV this often proves enough 
to induce them to be engaged with the projects. This is critical as states are ultimately responsible for 
                                                     
53 As mentioned earlier, combined contributions of states and other institutions to the SPV capital must be such that 
entrepreneurs retain at least 51% share of the equity part. In the typical case of a 40% (and in any case less than Rs. 40 
crores) central government grant and 40% term loan, this means a limit of 9% of project costs (and less than Rs. 9 crores). 
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providing necessary clearances, in particular for land (principally, conversion of agricultural to 
industrial land). On the other hand, the relatively low amount of the State grant, such that the project 
often remains viable even in its absence, means State politicians and bureaucrats will most often lack 
the leverage to distort location decisions. 
In addition, the SITP is relatively well adapted to the political economy of State-Center relationships. 
Since State and Centre contributions are separate, not subject to one another (in contrast, for example, 
to the Food Park Scheme mentioned earlier), they become less likely to be subject to disputes 
resulting in delays. The burden of engagement and coordination with various State agencies is placed 
not on the central ministry, but on local entrepreneurs, organized through the SPV and supported by 
the PMC’s experience, skills and contacts.  
Local entrepreneurs will in most cases be substantially better positioned to navigate the political 
economy of their State than a central ministry, and it is they who are tasked with this by the scheme. 
As a last resort, recourse to the center remains possible for entrepreneurs in case of major issues such 
as long delays in approval, which does maintain some pressure on states to perform. In short, rather 
than resting on State-Centre coordination for the multiple routine processes needed to build the park, 
the scheme leverages the latent capacity of local entrepreneurs, but provides them implicit leverage 
through, in extremis, recourse to the Centre. 
As a result, the scheme, though having a uniform national design, adapts itself in its implementation 
to wide variations in local conditions. For example, the political incentives to develop industry in 
Gujarat are very strong, and GIDC 54  is recognized as one of the most efficient state industrial 
development corporations, while in Maharashtra the environment is often perceived as much less 
favorable on both counts. However, almost as many parks have been built or are being built in both, 
with limited and offsetting gains to each in time to completion, investment and job creation (cf. 
Exhibits 2, 4 and 5 for detailed figures). We would note however that both states do have a substantial 
base of capable local entrepreneurs. The scheme design seems then to shift the variable for success 
from a State’s political economy or the quality of coordination between it and the Centre, to the 
capabilities of local entrepreneurs. 
Those entrepreneurs’ capacity is, crucially, also augmented by the PMCs. The effectiveness of PMCs 
of course depends on the thickness of the local consulting market: consultancies capable of 
performing this role must be present, and the more of them there are, the higher the bar for their 
selection can be set while mitigating capture risks.  
The all-encompassing role of PMCs reduces coordination issues and increases the ability to deal with 
uncertainties as the project is being implemented. It is noteworthy that IL&FS has had both an 
advisory role for the government (“MoT-PMC”) and an execution role for the firms (“SPV-PMC”) in 
80% of the parks it is PMC for, and the ratio was said to be similar for other PMCs. Although there 
are risks to such integration (examined in the last part of this section), the advantages are increased 
flexibility in adapting design as implementation proceeds, and the removal of one agent in the 
execution chain. The PMC can then have few excuses for delays in executing plans it has devised. 
The PMCs also seem to intermediate effectively between the government and entrepreneurs. Their 
incentives are partially aligned with both: to remain empanelled, they must demonstrate their 
performance to the ministry by getting parks built and functional in a timely manner, while they are 
ultimately chosen for each park by the entrepreneurs themselves. They do not though share profits 
                                                     
54 Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation 
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with the entrepreneurs and do not have a formal interest in which parks or states perform better 
(though the potential for informal collusion is dealt with below). Their intermediation between the 
central ministry and local entrepreneurs has benefits both practical and political: it enables the 
ministry to oversee a large number of parks by monitoring a small number of PMCs; it overcomes 
potential distrust between private sector and government; and creates distance, so the government 
does not negotiate directly with individual entrepreneurs receiving grants.  
Overall this means PMCs are key to the potential for the scheme to learn about itself, and to foster 
learning among the firms in parks. On the former, the PMCs observe the scheme’s performance in a 
wide variety of contexts, and, by competing among each other, are incentivized to innovate within the 
existing scheme design. This has resulted, for example, in a number of the financing innovations 
described above. When the scheme design is refreshed, as is occurring at the time of writing, the 
knowledge gained by the PMCs can be rapidly consolidated. This does of course raise risks of capture 
and distortion by the PMCs. The ministry’s ability to balance these risks and benefits will be critical 
to the ability of the scheme to improve its results, or conversely, to drop in performance.  
The PMCs also enhance the ability of firms themselves to learn, acting as transmission mechanisms 
for knowledge between widely separate firms across India. It is not clear to what extent this potential 
is being actively exploited at present; the potential to do so more actively would clearly form part of 
any more general initiative to exploit the social infrastructure built by the scheme, in this case doing 
so across parks as well as within them. 
That brings attention back to the entrepreneurs themselves. The scheme distinguishes itself by leaving 
the initiative and ultimate decision-making to them. The first advantage is that entrepreneurs represent 
the “demand” for the park and therefore are naturally best placed (in terms of incentives) to decide on 
an appropriate location: convenient for entrepreneurs in the SPV, for backward and forward linkages 
and so that the price of land does not make it prohibitive. Similarly, dimensioning of the parks is 
naturally best discussed with those who will be occupying them, i.e. SPV members, with technical 
advice from the PMC. Demand and dimensioning are thus subject to verification by the ultimate users 
in a way costly to themselves, i.e., in a more reliable means than by the signing of an ‘expression of 
interest’ or ‘MoU’, or by the completion of a “demand study” (whose point estimates of the future 
will almost always be wrong).55 
Infrastructure design and procurement are then left under the flexible discretion of the entrepreneurs 
themselves, subject to monitoring and other means to control fraud (discussed further below). In 
contrast, for example, previous policies such as APES fragmented the grants into many portions to be 
used for specific purposes: Rs. 10 crores for infrastructure facilities, Rs. 5 crores for effluent treatment 
plants, Rs. 2 crores for training facilities and so forth. 
Grant size, structure and collusion risk 
Turning from the division of roles to the grants themselves, we first note their size. The cap on the 
central grant of Rs. 40 crore and 40% of total cost in effect limits parks to an investment cost of 
around Rs. 100 crore ($20m), corresponding in India to a size of around 100 acres.56 The policy 
originally had a target of at least 50 entrepreneurs per park, but has subsequently introduced flexibility 
conditional on a floor on investment commitments: the aggregate minimum investment in land, 
factory buildings and plant & machinery in the park is Rs. 100 crores if there are more than 50 
                                                     
55 Neufville, R., & Scholtes, S. (2011). Flexibility in Engineering Design. The MIT Press. 
56 Since the grant is 40% of project costs, the cap of Rs. 40 crore grant is reached for a Rs. 100 crore. Since larger projects 
will typically generate larger scale economies, it is optimal to design a Rs. 100 crore park. 
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entrepreneurs, Rs. 150 crores if there are between 25 and 49 entrepreneurs, and Rs. 300 crores 
between 5 and 24 entrepreneurs.  
In practice, park size has averaged 106.5 acres, and 56.5 entrepreneurs per park. Field visits indicate 
that such a size is large enough to create some agglomeration economies, but small enough to allow 
land acquisition in most cases, to not unduly disturb the local, state and national political economy (by 
creating large incentives for interference, as discussed above), and to allow for a functional 
organization of the entrepreneurs in the SPV. Achieving this “right-sizing” of parks is probably one of 
the most important effects of the specific SITP grant design, reinforcing the capacity and incentives 
implications of the role allocation design. 
By contrast, many of India’s SEZs were considered too small, with only one or two firms, to result in 
agglomeration economies. On the other end of the scale, huge parks known as PCPIRs involve 
enormous land acquisition and infrastructure provision for areas of several thousand hectares.57 SITP 
parks seem to strike a sweet spot in this respect: modest enough to get things done and fly under the 
radar politically, but large enough for their SPV to be an effective local actor, and for them to 
generate some agglomeration economies.58 
The method of grant disbursement in SITP is also important for reinforcing both capacity and 
incentives. The first disbursal (of 10%) occurs after final approval of the project, which itself happens 
only after monies have been disbursed for land procurement and the SPV can prove it has received 
ownership of the land. Given land markets in India, the initial disbursal is then a selection mechanism 
on the capacity of entrepreneurs to navigate the local political economy. Subsequent disbursals are 
made in advance after the completion of specific milestones and the full utilization of the previous 
disbursement. The schedule usually has five milestones, with 10%, 30%, 60%, 90%, and finally 100% 
disbursal on completion of the park and start of production by at least 25% of the units. By disbursing 
in advance, the scheme reduces liquidity constraints faced by SMEs, in contrast to schemes that 
disburse on a reimbursement basis; disbursing in tranches linked to milestones (including a final one 
that checks proper demand for, and functioning of the park), as verified by the PMC for the MoT, 
incentivizes and disciplines both SPV and PMC. The structure also makes it difficult to use the 
scheme for subsidized land speculation: grants will not be disbursed if parks are not built. 
The structure of the grant may though raise a concern of subversion of the scheme for personal gain, 
e.g., through diversion of the grants by the entrepreneurs. To date, to the authors’ knowledge, there 
has not been an accusation of misuse of funds or misappropriation against either the scheme or any of 
the parks. It is too early to rule this out in every case, and one cannot rule it out in theory.  
The scheme’s design does though seem to provide relatively strong controls against it, and while this 
does not mean informal bargains might not be made, those do not so far appear to be impacting 
scheme performance. To understand why this might be the case, we return to the roles and incentives 
in the scheme, and how those interact with grant disbursal. 
The recourse to PMCs as a new capacity provider and in fine as intermediaries between entrepreneurs 
and the government is vital to the scheme, but creates risks on both sides. First there could be 
collusion with the government to be selected to be on the panel of PMCs. On the other side, PMCs on 
                                                     
57 Petrochemical Investment Region. See the analysis of the SEZ scheme referenced previously. 
58 For example in all four SITP parks visited in Tamil Nadu, it was clear that the grouping in an SPV structure is what 
allowed entrepreneurs to negotiate a specific electricity feeder for the park with state authorities. Similarly in the case of the 
Surat Super Yarn Park in Gujarat, last-mile road connectivity was negotiated with and provided by the state infrastructure 
development corporation (GIDC) – thanks to the existing high quality highway nearby, this meant the park was accessible 
from the city even though land had been bought in an under-developed area to reduce costs. 
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the panel could bargain with entrepreneurs to be selected for projects. Both would potentially impact 
scheme performance. At the park development stage, in theory there could also be collusion of PMCs 
with entrepreneurs on progress reports and utilization certificates to share grant money instead of 
investing it in the parks. Conversely when PMCs combine design and “execution” responsibilities 
(“MoT-PMC” and “SPV-PMC” roles) they could budget more for themselves in the DPR. Finally 
PMCs could reduce their efforts (and save money) in park development and hide underperformance to 
both the government and entrepreneurs, since, as MoT-PMC, they are also responsible for monitoring. 
Collusion on PMC selection on the panels is limited, in theory, by the use of a competitive two-stage 
bidding process. Early signs are that this process is quite rigorous, with a PMC having been dropped, 
and only seven selected in total.59 Being on the panel in one 5-year Plan Period does not guarantee 
presence in the subsequent period, creating a strong incentive for performance over the period. 
Further performance discipline on the PMCs is provided by their competition to be selected by firms 
to develop a project (and then have this project be approved),60 such selection and approval being a 
precondition for the PMC to be paid the consulting fee by the government. Collusion with the 
entrepreneurs on selection is itself limited by the firms’ own profit motive and the phased disbursal 
process. In short, a low-performing PMC would have difficulty enticing firms to select it, as those 
firms would then be unlikely to receive the grants. The PMC would also simply not be paid, if its 
work was too low quality to result in an approved DPR. 
There is also a tradeoff for PMCs once they are appointed for a project between the gains from 
colluding, overcharging or lowering efforts as described above and the risk of losing further 
appointments and corresponding fees if they are caught, or discarded because of underperformance. If 
fees are high enough and performance is rewarded in practice, PMCs are likely to choose not to 
engage in such activities. 
Of course, this depends on PMCs facing a credible risk of being dropped from the panel in case of 
underperformance. But this has, it seems, already occurred, as MoT removed a PMC, SREI Capital 
Markets Ltd,61 from the SITP PMC panel after it had suddenly “abandoned” the SPV it was supposed 
to support (though the cause of abandonment is not clear). Similarly, the fact that failing parks were 
abandoned relatively early might be indicative of the constraints on accurate reporting by PMCs.62 
Finally, misappropriation is rendered practically difficult by the process through which grant money is 
channeled for project development. Except for the limited share of grant money that can be allocated 
to administrative expenses, the SPV has no direct access to grant money, which goes directly from an 
escrow account at a designated state-owned bank (usually the same that would provide the term loan) 
to the private contractor executing construction plans. This mechanism also allows verification that 
money is spent in the 60/40 proportion by the entrepreneurs (and other contributors) and the MoT, 
                                                     
59 More details would be needed on the exact assessment criteria to assess their appropriateness, but even a perfect list would 
not prevent collusion and subversion. Rather, the risk would be most affected by the incentives environment, which is what 
we focus on here. 
60  As mentioned earlier, the DPR approval procedure includes passing first a Project Scrutiny Committee, an inter-
ministerial committee headed by the Joint Secretary for SITP in the MoT, and then a Project Approval Committee headed by 
the Minister of Textiles. 
61 SREI Capital Markets Ltd is a large, reputable firm with a 50/50 JV with BNP Paribas Leasing Solutions, the largest 
leasing group in Europe. 
62 The two IL&FS cancelled parks, already evoked earlier, were the Hyderabad Hi-Tech Weaving Park in Andhra Pradesh 
and the Shri Dhairyashil Mane park in Maharashtra. The MoT took the decision on observing the lack of progress by the 
SPV in moving forward after disbursement of 30% of the committed grant amount. The other two were the Vaigai Hi-Tech 
Weaving Park in Tamil Nadu (managed by CS Architects) and the Bharat Fabtex & Corporate Park in Rajasthan (managed 
by SREI Capital Markets), both cancelled after 10% disbursement, i.e. the first milestone. 
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respectively, for completion of the milestones. Maintaining the proportions (with some flexibility) 
along the payment schedule reduces further the opportunity for abuse of grant money. The fee 
payment structure for PMCs follows those same milestones, which further incentivizes PMCs to 
support completion of the parks in a timely manner.63 Vendor selection must be approved by the SPV 
board, which includes entrepreneurs, state officials and others. 
An underlying support for many of these controls may, again, be the modest size of the individual 
parks, interacting with the structure of the industry. The average industrial plot size per entrepreneur 
in the parks is around 6.1 acres, with a median of only 1.9 acres. Participants are small, likely without 
the financial resources to incentivize national agents and firms (officials or PMCs) to an extent that it 
would justify the risks that such national agents would face on a national scale (even if they were 
hypothetically susceptible). Even joining forces within a park, with 50 entrepreneurs per park on 
average, and the limit imposed of a 20% equity stake in the SPV, entrepreneurs would face a 
coordination issue – the maintenance of the secret – if attempting to defraud the scheme. Collusion 
would require a dozen of firms and officials to take significant risks in concert over a period of years, 
to misappropriate a relatively small grant. 
So it may be that the mechanisms that limit subversion described earlier might not have worked in a 
less fragmented industry, or if larger firms had been involved, if parks were much larger, or if the 
grants available per park were more substantial. These might prove to be preconditions to replicating 
the model successfully in environments more conducive to informal bargains and subversion, or at 
least conditions that are strongly supportive of success in other cases. The high fragmentation of the 
textile sector in India means individual firms may have less influence on the government, and 
therefore less leverage for subversion of the scheme. This might not be true even in the same value 
chain, in input sectors such as Man-Made Fibers (MMF), which is almost duopolistic. It might also be 
of concern if the scheme is used for very large parks, whose SPVs might become locally dominant, 
particularly if the remainder of the local industry is undeveloped and unorganized and so lacks 
countervailing sources of voice. 
VI. REMAINING PITFALLS AND THE CHALLENGE OF SCALING UP 
Reinforcing and sustaining cluster effects 
Despite the observations made in Section IV, there were many indications that cluster effects could be 
more actively strengthened and sustained. In some parks, entrepreneurs stated that they would like to 
pursue agglomeration effects further, but that liquidity pressures on the SPV had prevented them 
doing so. In other parks, some of the firms merely expressed interest, when prompted, in activities 
such as common purchasing.  
Various schemes at both state and central levels are available to fund such activities in many cases, 
indicating that either a funding scheme is not an appropriate remedy, or those other schemes could be 
more effectively designed, perhaps learning from the SITP itself.  
It could also be argued that, with firms already co-located, and receiving a grant, they should engage 
in these activities without subsidies, so that it is not clear what market failure remains in place. On the 
other hand, as mentioned earlier, it seems that the scheme design has been successful at creating 
strong cohesion between the entrepreneurs, by involving them from the (difficult) starting point of 
                                                     
63 The conclusion in not changed in the case where PMC roles are divided for advisory and execution, as the MoT-PMC will 
still be paid according to the grant disbursal milestones, and the SPV-PMC will be paid according to an SPV-determined 
schedule that would align with the SPV interest, which is also to complete the project. 
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park development, the identification and purchase of land. This is in contrast with other park 
programs where firms are called to fill in a park only after its completion, and therefore would be 
expected to have less sense of common belonging.  
In other words, the means by which the scheme creates “hard” infrastructure also creates “soft”, in the 
form of a platform for the development of cluster effects. In that case, it may be that some form of 
limited support for demonstration effects may be an appropriate addition to SPV costs in SITP, but 
this would require further investigation.64 It should also be investigated how certain design features, 
for example the format of monitoring reports, might divert efforts from developing such effects, 
though they have proven relatively effective at getting the common infrastructure built. An open 
question is to what extent the scheme will have the capacity to learn about and improve on such 
design features and their effects. 
The prospects of expansion 
The relative success of the scheme has motivated its expansion, both in terms of adding new parks 
under SITP itself, as well as the model spreading to other sectors. Several other government entities 
and ministries, as well as some states, have now devised schemes that are highly similar to SITP. As 
mentioned above, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) already had a similar 
scheme, the Industrial Infrastructure Upgradation Scheme (IIUS) launched in 2003.  
By definition it supports the upgrading of existing clusters, and did not initially require the 
involvement of a PMC or equivalent. IIUS was however modified in 2009 to add a “Project 
Management Agency” (PMA), engaged by DIPP to carry out the financial and technical appraisal of 
the projects, together with a requirement for entrepreneurs to “ensure that the project proposal is of 
highest quality and a consultancy organization of national repute is engaged for its preparation”. 
However it has had to rely on much more generous grant amounts and conditions to generate enough 
demand.65 
Other sectors also now have similar schemes in various stages under their respective ministries: 
plastics under the Ministry of Fertilizers and Petroleum Products; the Mega Food Parks Schemes of 
the MoFP (replaces the more traditional FPS with an SITP-like scheme); leather under the Ministry of 
Commerce; engineering under the Ministry of Heavy Industries; and IT-Electronics with the recently 
launched Electronics Manufacturing Clusters (EMCs) of the Department of Electronics and 
Information Technology (DEITy). In such cases, it will be important that the relative roles, incentives 
and grant structures that work in the SITP are maintained and that the scheme is not pushed into 
sectors or contexts where its key features will no longer be effective. As noted above, this particularly 
relates to the industry structure, the capabilities of firms, and the size of the parks. We would, for 
example, be cautious about the prospects for “mega food parks”. 
Given their importance, the capacity and incentives of the PMCs must also be kept in mind. For 
example, despite the competitive selection mechanism, PMCs might have weaker incentives to 
perform on each additional park they are awarded, once they each have “enough” parks to manage, 
i.e., such that losing access to new parks would lose some of its effectiveness in discipline. Moreover, 
if there are too few PMCs, their market might become oligopolistic. Neither risk appears likely at the 
moment, and in its inception the scheme only had one PMC, IL&FS, with few to no signs of non-
performance by it while a monopoly. As such, the competition between PMCs, while important, may 
                                                     
64 Bloom, N., McKenzie, D. & al. (2012). Does management matter? Evidence from India. NBER Working Paper. 
65 The IIUS was typically offering grants worth 75% of project costs, subject to a ceiling of Rs. 50 crore. Further details are 
available from the authors on request. 
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be a lesser factor than other of the schemes’ design features. The quality and robustness of PMC 
empanelment will be crucial to mitigate such risks. 
In terms of their own capacity expansion to handle a larger volume of parks, IL&FS reported that they 
did not expect to face a shortage of adequate recruits, with the notable exception of “soft skills” 
requirements. At the ministry level, a fast and effective expansion of the scheme might also mean 
stretched capacities to monitor, despite the consolidating work of PMCs, and therefore a dilution of 
attention and ability to react to individual project difficulties. This may be mitigated by careful 
attention to the project pipeline, i.e., so that new waves of approvals are given only when earlier 
waves are nearing the completion of their construction. This appears, for example, to have been 
followed by the SITP. 
The land issue 
In scaling up, both for SITP itself and for other parks, an issue outside the ambit of the scheme might 
be the availability and price of land, for the expansion of current parks and for building new parks. In 
existing parks, the price of land varied significantly across parks and across states. Considering the 32 
IL&FS parks, prices range from an average of Rs. 1.7 lakhs per acre in Tamil Nadu to Rs. 1.3 crores 
(or Rs 130 lakhs) per acre for the park being built in West Bengal. Variations between parks within 
each state can also be quite significant, for example in Gujarat where prices ranged from Rs. 3.3 lakhs 
to Rs. 59.4 lakhs among the six parks built there. 
Much of this variance might be attributed to the dynamics of industrial land markets in India in the 
last seven years, since the first parks were launched. Land in general has been rising rapidly in price, 
particularly land around any industrial area. In all the parks visited, surrounding land prices had 
increased by factors of more than 20 or 30 in the 5 to 6 years since the start of the projects, according 
to the entrepreneurs. This was a much larger increase than that of land prices in general in each state, 
and was a serious impediment to the expected future growth of the park. Many SPVs had to some 
extent anticipated the problem by buying typically twice the amount of land initially needed. This 
should be kept in mind when evaluating any industrial park program in India (SITP or not): land 
utilization may not be a good measure of whether a park has suffered a type (ii) failure. Exhibit 7 
summarizes land prices and other land-related data, first according to the state, then according to the 
purchase process: private (with or without state assistance) or state. 
On the other hand, despite increasing prices, entrepreneurs were confident that they could find land 
for new parks. This may again reflect the modest size of the parks. They were keen on roles (1) and 
(3) given to them in the scheme, i.e., having the flexibility to choose and negotiate park location and 
size according to their own price and viability criteria.66 
Available data on existing parks is not conclusive on this issue, especially as land prices have sharply 
increased since the inception of the scheme. Price variability was lower in existing parks for land 
acquired through, or with support of, the local state authority, but the average price was not 
significantly lower (excluding one outlier), and average completion time was slightly higher. The 
highest expected completion time (9.1 years) is for the one park in Tamil Nadu where the state 
acquired the land for the park, in a state where otherwise completion time has been shorter than 
average. Similarly one of the two parks cancelled in the IL&FS sample also received state support, 
though the ratio of parks receiving some form of support for land is more around one third. However 
                                                     
66 Typically depending on the type of manufacturing activity considered: close to ports if export-oriented; close to raw 
materials if backward integration is most critical; close to the parent manufacturer for its ancillary/auxiliary activities etc. 
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the sample is too small to draw any firm conclusions: only 10 parks received state support, and those 
are spread over 5 states, with parks of variable size and structure (e.g. area per entrepreneur).  
Some observations can still help in thinking about how to treat the land issue upon expanding the 
scheme. First, entrepreneurs interviewed systematically dismissed any interest in placing parks in 
SEZs, even when pressed on the potentially large fiscal gains and regulatory advantages. Some 
mentioned the requirement for exclusive export orientation as a constraint, but most suggested 
interference from the government (state or center) as the strongest impediment. In other words, given 
the controversy it causes, the more capable entrepreneurs seemed to prefer the government not be 
involved in land acquisition. Such acquisition would also raise the prospect of the scheme being 
accused of being a “land grab”, as occurred for SEZs, causing a public backlash. The MoT recently 
removed land purchase costs from project costs to calculate grants, to avoid financing soaring land 
prices and to put more pressure on entrepreneurs to negotiate these prices. This move does not appear 
to have prevented the excess demand for more parks mentioned above. 
Second, early anecdotal evidence from the Ministry of MSMEs’ Cluster Development Program, 
targeted at Micro and Small Enterprises (hence its name MSE-CDP), tends to confirm the view that 
systematic state involvement in land acquisition causes multiple delays and cost increases. MSE-CDP 
is almost identical to SITP both in its grant design and in its role allocation, except that it makes the 
state responsible for the critical step of land location selection and involves it in acquisition. The 
result so far has been political exploitation of the land issue, with countless trials in process and 
rocketing costs, and a general slow-down because projects have to be processed through the whole 
state bureaucracy. When the state intervened for land acquisition in SITP, it was on an ad-hoc basis, 
and location selection (role 1) was still in the hands of the SPV, which likely means the SPV had 
already considered the local political economy of land acquisition. 
We would note in closing that the position of the entrepreneurs within the SITP seems rather unique. 
In public discourse in India, and in individual and group discussions, there is a general clamor from 
the private sector for public support in acquiring land. Prior negative experiences seem slow to 
dampen this. It may be that the long history of public attempts to “help” textile SMEs, including the 
chronicle of earlier industrial park schemes, has led to firms in that sector being among the first to 
acknowledge that the interference that comes along with public acquisition is rarely worth the cost 
that is saved. This may be a mirror effect to the MoT’s own innovation as it developed the SITP. 
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Why do some industrial park programs result in operating parks, and many not? This paper has 
attempted to answer this by decomposing industrial park implementation into elementary steps and 
analyzing how role allocation among them interacts with the political economy. This was motivated 
by the examination of a Government of India scheme that introduced two key innovations: leadership 
left to entrepreneurs on all aspects of scheme implementation; and a shift by both government and its 
consultants from building parks and then inviting firms, to organizing and monitoring prospective 
firms, which then lead the building of the park themselves. 
We found that not only these innovations, but how the design deployed them in the political economy, 
resulted in a relatively successful scheme, particularly in comparison to other industrial park programs 
in the same context. However, we found mixed evidence for avoiding type (iii) failures, i.e., for 
realizing “soft” cluster effects. Though our findings have been mostly anecdotal so far, there has been 
widespread agreement among SPV and IL&FS representatives alike that the key driver, or “root 
cause”, of current achievements has been the cohesion between the entrepreneurs themselves. Such 
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cohesion was frequently reported to stem from the “leadership” and “vision” of one of the 
entrepreneurs, but was likely reinforced by the capacity building efforts of the PMC67. Means to 
systematize these effects should be considered next, for example potentially through the addition of 
funding to already-built parks for initial demonstration effects in “soft” clustering. 68  However, 
programs to fund these types of “soft” capabilities are at least as prone to failure as industrial park 
programs, so the same innovation and care would need to go into any such addition. 
It is important to note as well that the MoT already engaged early in an ongoing fine-tuning process of 
SITP, facilitated by the intermediation of PMCs, following feedback from the ground and analysis of 
early results. “Soft issues” have been part of the discussion, with for example prospects of including 
the salary of a professional manager of the SPV in project costs and of refining and intensifying 
capacity building exercises. In other words, the scheme shows early signs of building in the capacity 
to learn about itself. It remains to be seen if this will become a core feature of the scheme; whether the 
learning will increase, decrease or leave neutral the quality of scheme implementation and the 
generation of outcomes; and whether this learning will repeat regularly or be sporadic and largely ad-
hoc. 
However, as the scheme is scaled up, changes in the policy should be careful to preserve what has 
contributed to success so far. This includes avoiding the temptation of much larger parks, given the 
importance of the modest size of SITP parks. In this context, many mid-sized parks seem preferable to 
a few very large ones (or a multitude of too small ones). Similarly, we would exercise caution on 
having the government more involved in the acquisition of land for the parks. 
Moreover, as the scheme spreads to other sectors, the design details will be crucial. For example, care 
must be taken that the industry structure and target firms (through the exact design parameters of the 
grants) are of the characteristics described in sections above. As importantly, the roles of location 
selection and park dimensioning should rest entirely or principally on the initiative and decision of the 
entrepreneurs, though at the outset catalyzed by the government or the PMC or both. If grants and 
parks are to be much larger than those in the SITP, the reasons for this should be carefully understood.  
In time, though, as these schemes progress, comparisons of them to the SITP will yield a rich set of 
lessons. Perhaps the principal lesson so far is that role allocation is the most sensitive parameter of 
industrial policy design for effective implementation. These roles are more diverse than the labels 
“PPP” or similar would have us believe, and can be taken on by a wide variety of actors, whose 
incentives must be carefully understood in designing grant disbursal mechanisms. In other words, the 
manner in which the park program fits the political economy likely matters more to avoiding type (i) 
and (ii) failures than does sector selection, demand estimation by technical consultants, the payment 
structure for such consultants, or other areas that typically receive more attention. 
This must be borne in mind when considering the possible replication of such a scheme, not only in 
other sectors in India, but in other countries. Such replication would be subject to an adaptation to the 
particular capacity and political economy conditions of each country. Variations such as industry 
structure might be relatively easy to measure, whether between sectors in the same country or 
between countries in the same sector.  
                                                     
67 As in most of our analysis, we extrapolate from our observations in IL&FS parks and our discussions with IL&FS 
representatives. We currently lack details on exactly how this capacity building effort is being conducted. 
68 Such capacity building exercises would likely be even more critical in the case of smaller entrepreneurs, such as those 
targeted by the MSE-CDP scheme mentioned earlier, as was confirmed by a state official deeply involved in the scheme 
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But the general political settlement, formal rules and institutions, and even more critically local 
informal rules would require a more in-depth analysis to assess their impact on the local political 
economy of scheme implementation. Political drive at the center might be different; institutions that 
can play the role of PMCs might be missing; entrepreneurship and the relationship of entrepreneurs 
with the local political environment might not be as developed; the entrepreneurs able to organize and 
build the parks might not yet exist; the scheme, if hastily combined with regulatory exemptions, might 
remove both the pressure for broader reform and the most effective advocates of it.  
In all, the most important lesson from the SITP for policymakers elsewhere may then arise not from 
the specific features of the scheme itself, but from its demonstration that thinking in new and creative 
ways about who does what, and how, within a given political economy, can lead to policy innovations 
and relative successes in areas previously characterized by a long record of desultory performance. 
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EXHIBITS 
Exhibit 1: List of 40 first parks and their basic characteristics 
No Project Name PMC State Location 
Project 
Cost 
GOI's 
Grant 
GOI Grant 
Released 
No of 
firms 
Land 
Area 
Target 
Private 
Investment 
Target 
Direct 
Jobs 
Target 
Indirect 
jobs 
Target 
Annual 
Production 
Units     
 
  
Rs. 
Crores 
Rs. 
Crores Rs. Crores   Acres Rs. Crores     Rs. Crores 
1 Hyderabad Hi-tech 
Weaving 
IL&FS AP Mahboob Nagar 58.0 23.2 12.0 29 60 208.0 2 500 2 500 370 
2 Hindupur Vyapar Apparel IL&FS AP Ananthpur 102.3 40.0 24.0 2 73 265.5 10 500 22 000 340 
3 Pochampally Handloom IL&FS AP Pochampally 34.0 13.6 13.6 6 22 50.0 5 000 3 000 40 
4 Brandix India Apparel 
City 
IL&FS AP Vishakhapatna 134.4 40.0 40.0 17 1 000 4 878.0 60 000 90 000 7 000 
5 MAS Fabric IL&FS AP Nellore 254.7 40.0 12.0 16 582 1 982.0 31 000 15 000 2 500 
6 Gujarat Eco Textile IL&FS GJ Surat 128.8 40.0 40.0 33 104 705.0 8 000 17 000 850 
7 Mundra SEZ Textile & 
Apparel 
IL&FS GJ Kutch 103.5 40.0 40.0 11 116 775.0 3 077 4 500 800 
8 Fairdeal IL&FS GJ Surat 105.6 40.0 24.0 53 54 312.7 2 900 4 300 1 200 
9 Vraj ITP IL&FS GJ Kheda 114.8 40.0 36.0 21 70 550.0 6 250 12 500 617 
10 Sayana ITP IL&FS GJ Surat 116.8 40.0 36.0 50 57 298.6 3 155 4 733 1 312 
11 Surat Super Yarn IL&FS GJ Surat 104.8 40.0 36.0 27 43 230.6 1 000 2 000 1 250 
12 RJD ITP Magus GJ Surat 106.5 40.0 36.0 579 56 352.7 4 270 6 405 598 
13 Metro Hi-Tech 
Cooperative 
IL&FS MH Ichalkaranji 106.5 40.0 36.0 86 99 335.0 5 000 5 000 212 
14 Pride india cooperative IL&FS MH Ichalkaranji 58.2 23.3 21.0 85 27 203.0 1 500 2 500 300 
15 Baramati Hi Tech IL&FS MH Baramati 108.5 40.0 34.8 22 60 250.0 5 500 6 000 380 
16 Shri Dhairyashil Mane 
Co-op Society 
IL&FS MH Ichalkaranji 72.3 28.9 8.7 167 65 376.6 3 300 5 000 370 
17 Deesan Infrastructure Magus MH Dhul 103.1 40.0 12.0 50 106 721.7 4 410 6 615 2 135 
18 Asmeeta Infrastructure Magus MH Bhawandi 200.8 40.0 4.0 65 73 673.2 7 634 11 451 1 046 
19 Islampur Integrated Technopak MH Sangl 102.1 40.0 40.0 12 35 334.3 10 000 0 904 
20 Latur Integrated Technopak MH Latur 102.6 40.0 40.0 20 50 257.4 10 000 0 617 
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21 Purna Global IL&FS MH Hingoli 91.8 36.7 22.0 41 55 205.0 1 100 550 200 
22 The Great Indian Linen & 
Textile 
IL&FS TN Perundurai 149.5 40.0 12.0 20 121 418.1 5 000 7 500 520 
23 SIMA Processing Centre IL&FS TN Cuddalore 111.6 40.0 12.0 10 248 475.0 5 000 15 000 500 
24 Palladam Hi-Tech 
Weaving 
IL&FS TN Palladam 55.4 22.2 22.2 90 65 161.3 2 500 3 500 300 
25 Komarapalayam Hi-Tech 
Weaving 
IL&FS TN Komarapalayam 34.8 13.9 12.5 57 31 125.7 1 500 1 500 350 
26 Karur ITP IL&FS TN Karur 116.1 40.0 40.0 42 104 227.0 3 000 4 000 623 
27 Madurai ITP IL&FS TN Madurai 87.3 34.9 31.4 15 110 409.8 3 000 4 000 900 
28 Vaigai Hi-Tech Weaving C.S. 
Architects 
TN Vaigai, Theni 65.1 24.0 2.4 90 41 145.2 6 080 0 361 
29 Kanchipuram AACM 
Handloom Silk 
C.S. 
Architects 
TN Kanchipuram 87.0 33.5 0.0 115 75 119.9 18 000 0 118 
30 Jaipur Texweaving IL&FS RJ Kishangarh 96.8 38.7 23.2 51 95 250.0 3 000 9 000 550 
31 Kishangarh Hi-Tech 
Textile 
IL&FS RJ Kishangarh 110.6 40.0 36.0 37 40 416.7 4 000 8 000 800 
32 Next Gen Textile IL&FS RJ Pali 101.4 40.0 24.0 53 100 416.2 9 450 10 000 1 050 
33 Jaipur Integrated 
Texcraft 
IL&FS RJ Jaipur 53.5 21.4 19.3 20 23 45.9 4 400 8 800 90 
34 Bharat Fabtex & 
Corporate 
SREI RJ Pali 103.1 40.0 4.0 27 120 416.5 9 450 0 922 
35 Lotus Integrated Tex IL&FS PB Barnala 110.3 40.0 36.0 8 100 847.7 2 400 2 950 1 740 
36 Rhythm Textile & Apparel IL&FS PB Nawanshehar 125.5 40.0 24.0 14 19 339.8 11 000 14 000 350 
37 Ludhiana ITP IL&FS PB Ludhiana 116.2 40.0 24.0 55 57 217.0 10 000 10 000 500 
38 EIGMEF Apparel IL&FS WB Kolkata 130.5 40.0 24.0 73 13 160.0 10 000 30 000 500 
39 Doddabalapur ITP IL&FS KA Doddabalapur 80.3 32.1 32.1 72 48 132.7 2 000 2 000 350 
40 CLC ITP IL&FS MP Chhindwara 95.7 38.3 11.5 20 47 301.7 2 000 1 000 400 
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Exhibit 2: Park completion time statistics and graphs (IL&FS parks only) 
Completion time statistics by state 
States 
No of 
Parks 
Average 
Grant 
Released 
Average area/ 
entrepreneur 
Average 
project 
cost  
Average 
estimated 
completion 
time Min Max Cancel 
Units  % Acres Rs crore Years Yrs Yrs % 
AP 5 68% 27.5 117 5.9 4.0 8.0 20% 
GJ 6 93% 3.5 112 5.8 4.6 7.0 0% 
KA 1 100% 0.7 80 5.9 5.9 5.9 0% 
MH 5 71% 1.2 87 7.0 6.1 7.6 20% 
MP 1 30% 2.4 96 6.0 6.0 6.0 0% 
PB 3 70% 5.0 117 6.0 5.5 6.3 0% 
RJ 4 75% 1.5 91 7.0 5.1 8.6 0% 
TN 6 73% 7.0 92 6.7 3.9 9.1 0% 
WB 1 60% 0.2 131 8.0 8.0 8.0 0% 
Total 32 75% 7.2 102 6.4 3.9 9.1 6% 
 
Completion time statistics by park (30 total, 2 cancelled not included here) 
Park Name 
Grant 
released 
Land 
Area  
Area/ 
entrepreneur Project Cost 
Estimated 
Compl 
Time 
Units % Acres Acres Rs. crore Years 
Baramati Hi Tech Textile  87% 60 2.7 109 7.0 
Brandix India Apparel City 100% 1 000 58.8 134 4.0 
CLC Textiile 30% 47 2.4 96 6.0 
Doddabalapur Integerated Textile 100% 48 0.7 80 5.9 
EIGMEF Apparel  60% 13 0.2 131 8.0 
Fairdeal Textile 90% 54 1.0 106 5.8 
Gujarat Eco Textile  100% 104 3.2 129 4.6 
Hindupur Vyapar Apparel  60% 73 36.6 102 8.0 
Jaipur Integrated Texcraft 90% 23 1.2 54 5.1 
Jaipur Texweaving  60% 95 1.9 97 8.6 
Karur Integrated Textile 100% 104 2.5 116 3.9 
Kishangarh Hi-Tech Textile  90% 40 1.1 111 7.0 
Komarapalayam Hi-Tech 
Weaving. 90% 31 0.5 35 7.0 
Lotus Integrated Tex 90% 100 12.5 110 6.3 
Ludhiana Integrated Textile 60% 57 1.0 116 5.5 
Madurai Integrated Textile 90% 110 7.3 87 6.3 
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MAS Fabric (India 30% 582 36.4 255 6.8 
Metro Hi-Tech Cooperative  90% 99 1.2 107 7.6 
Mundra SEZ Textile & Apparel  100% 116 10.6 104 5.1 
Next Gen Textile 60% 100 1.9 101 7.3 
Palladam Hi-Tech Weaving 100% 65 0.7 55 4.7 
Pochampally Handloom  100% 22 3.7 34 4.7 
Pride india cooperative Textile  90% 27 0.3 58 7.4 
Purna Global Textiles 60% 55 1.3 92 6.1 
Rhythm Textile & Apparel 60% 19 1.3 125 6.1 
Sayana Textile 90% 57 1.1 117 5.3 
SIMA Textile Processing Centre 30% 248 24.8 112 9.1 
Surat Super Yarn  90% 43 1.6 105 7.0 
The Great Indian Linen & Textile 
Infrastructure Company 30% 121 6.1 149 8.9 
Vraj Integrated Textile  90% 70 3.3 115 7.0 
Average 77% 119 7.6 105 6.4 
 
Correlations with estimated completion times 
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Figure Ib 
 
Figure IIa 
 
Figure IIb 
R² = 0.0955 
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Figure IIIa 
 
 
Figure IIIb 
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Exhibit 3: Comparisons between SITP and SEZ Act implementation 
Metric SEZ Act SITP 
Official Start Date February 2006 July 2005 
Number of projects formally approved by end 2011 580 40 
Number of projects notified by end 2011 380 36 
Conversion ratio 1: notified/approved 66% 90% 
Operational projects by end 2011 124 24 
Conversion ratio 2: operational/approved 21% 60% 
Of which non-IT 44 24 
 
Notes 
Formally approved means, for SEZs, having put in an application - the same definition is used for 
SITP 
Notified means having secured necessary land and being ready to start building - the same definition 
is used for SITP 
Operational means being at least in the first stage of production - the same definition is used for SITP 
Sources 
http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/pdf/List_of322notifiedSEZsunderSEZAct2005as19.6.09-
masterlist.pdf 
World Bank (2012), “Learning from SEZs in India”, Unpublished 
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Exhibit 4: Investment statistics for IL&FS SITP parks 
Investment statistics by state (average numbers, including all 32 parks) 
States 
No of 
Parks 
Area 
/unit 
Project 
cost  
Target 
investment  
Grant 
Released 
Investment 
achieved 
Target 
investment 
/grant ratio 
Current 
investment 
/grant ratio 
Units  Acres Rs crores Rs crores % %   
AP 5 27.5 117 1477 68% 25% 38.2 4.7 
GJ 6 3.5 112 479 93% 43% 12.0 5.8 
KA 1 0.7 80 133 100% 121% 4.1 5.0 
MH 5 1.2 87 274 71% 36% 8.4 3.4 
MP 1 2.4 96 302 30% 5% 7.9 1.4 
PB 3 5.0 117 468 70% 24% 11.7 4.0 
RJ 4 1.5 91 282 75% 40% 7.4 2.6 
TN 6 7.0 92 303 73% 33% 9.3 3.0 
WB 1 0.2 131 160 60% 25% 4.0 1.7 
Total 32 7.2 102 518 75% 36% 13.8 3.9 
 
 Investment statistics by park (removing the 2 cancelled parks) 
Park Name 
Area 
/unit 
Project 
cost  
Target 
investment  
Grant 
Released 
Investment 
achieved 
Target 
investment 
/grant ratio 
Current 
investment 
/grant ratio 
Units Acres Rs crores Rs crores % %   
Baramati Hi Tech 
Textile 2.7 109 250 87% 60% 6.3 4.3 
Brandix India 
Apparel City 58.8 134 4 878 100% 12% 122.0 14.2 
CLC Textiile 2.4 96 302 30% 5% 7.9 1.4 
Doddabalapur 
Integerated Textile 0.7 80 133 100% 121% 4.1 5.0 
EIGMEF Apparel 0.2 131 160 60% 25% 4.0 1.7 
Fairdeal Textile 1.0 106 313 90% 40% 7.8 5.2 
Gujarat Eco Textile 3.2 129 705 100% 56% 17.6 10.0 
Hindupur Vyapar 
Apparel 36.6 102 265 60% 19% 6.6 2.1 
Jaipur Integrated 
Texcraft 1.2 54 46 90% 93% 2.1 2.2 
Jaipur Texweaving 1.9 97 250 60% 24% 6.5 2.6 
Karur Integrated 
Textile 2.5 116 227 100% 55% 5.7 3.1 
Kishangarh Hi-Tech 
Textile 1.1 111 417 90% 32% 10.4 3.7 
Komarapalayam Hi-
Tech Weaving. 0.5 35 126 90% 42% 9.0 4.2 
Lotus Integrated Tex 12.5 110 848 90% 29% 21.2 6.9 
Ludhiana Integrated 
Textile 1.0 116 217 60% 24% 5.4 2.1 
Madurai Integrated 
Textile 7.3 87 410 90% 23% 11.7 3.0 
MAS Fabric India 36.4 255 1 982 30% 2% 49.6 2.6 
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Metro Hi-Tech 
Cooperative 1.2 107 335 90% 37% 8.4 3.5 
Mundra SEZ Textile 
& Apparel 10.6 104 775 100% 57% 19.4 11.0 
Next Gen Textile 1.9 101 416 60% 10% 10.4 1.8 
Palladam Hi-Tech 
Weaving 0.7 55 161 100% 68% 7.3 5.0 
Pochampally 
Handloom 3.7 34 50 100% 84% 3.7 3.1 
Pride india 
cooperative Textile 0.3 58 203 90% 54% 8.7 5.3 
Purna Global Textiles 1.3 92 205 60% 24% 5.6 2.3 
Rhythm Textile & 
Apparel 1.3 125 340 60% 20% 8.5 2.9 
Sayana Textile 1.1 117 299 90% 32% 7.5 2.7 
SIMA Textile 
Processing Centre 24.8 112 475 30% 4% 11.9 1.5 
Surat Super Yarn 1.6 105 231 90% 57% 5.8 3.6 
The Great Indian 
Linen & Textile 
Infrastructure 
Company 6.1 149 418 30% 4% 10.5 1.5 
Vraj Integrated 
Textile 3.3 115 550 90% 17% 13.8 2.6 
Average 7.6 105 533 77% 38% 14.0 4.0 
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Exhibit 5: Scatter plots of investment target achievement 
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Exhibit 6: Jobs, production and efficiency statistics (average numbers, IL&FS parks) 
States 
No of 
Parks 
Target 
Annual 
Production 
Target 
Direct 
Jobs 
Target 
Production 
/Job ratio 
Current 
direct jobs 
(Feb12) 
Target 
grant /job 
ratio 
Current 
grant /job 
ratio 
Units  Rs. Crore  Rs. Lakhs  Rs. Lakhs Rs. Lakhs 
AP 5 10 250 109 000 8 23 700 0.2 5.0 
GJ 6 6 029 24 382 42 2 840 1.5 11.5 
KA 1 350 2 000 18 250 1.6 12.8 
MH 5 1 462 16 400 12 7 280 1.6 3.4 
MP 1 400 2 000 20 0 1.9 N/A 
PB 3 2 590 23 400 27 1 137 0.8 10.6 
RJ 4 2 490 20 850 13 1 150 0.8 10.1 
TN 6 3 193 20 000 18 5 420 1.0 2.1 
WB 1 500 10 000 5 0 0.4 N/A 
Total 32 27 264 228 032 20 41 777 1.1 7.4 
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Exhibit 7: Land statistics by state and by purchase type (IL&FS parks) 
Land statistics by state (average numbers, 32 IL&FS parks) 
State/acquisition 
process 
No of 
Parks Land Area 
Area 
/unit 
Project 
Cost /acre 
Land cost 
/acre 
Min 
cost/acre 
Max Land 
cost/acre 
Units  Acres Acres Rs. Crore Rs. Lakhs Rs. Lakhs Rs. Lakhs 
AP 5 347 27.5 0.9 2.8 0.0 5.4 
Private 4 184 19.7 1.1 3.4 1.5 5.4 
State 1 1000 58.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
GJ 6 74 3.5 1.7 21.0 3.3 59.4 
Private 6 74 3.5 1.7 21.0 3.3 59.4 
KA 1 48 0.7 1.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 
State 1 48 0.7 1.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 
MH 5 61 1.2 1.6 4.9 1.6 8.0 
Private 1 55 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
State 4 63 1.1 1.5 5.8 4.1 8.0 
MP 1 47 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Private 1 47 2.4 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 
PB 3 59 5.0 3.3 35.1 21.0 54.7 
Private 3 59 5.0 3.3 35.1 21.0 54.7 
RJ 4 64 1.5 1.8 11.1 0.7 36.3 
Private 1 100 1.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 
State 3 53 1.4 2.0 14.6 3.5 36.3 
TN 6 113 7.0 0.9 1.7 0.5 3.5 
Private 5 86 3.4 1.0 1.3 0.5 1.9 
State 1 248 24.8 0.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
WB 1 13 0.2 10.1 125.8 125.8 125.8 
Private 1 13 0.2 10.1 125.8 125.8 125.8 
Grand Total 32 116 7.2 1.8 15.2 0.0 125.8 
 
Land statistics by purchase type: private (with or without state support), or state acquired 
Acquisition 
process/IDC 
No of 
Parks 
Land 
Area 
Area 
/unit 
Project 
Cost 
/acre 
Land cost 
/acre 
Min 
cost/acre 
Max Land 
cost/acre 
Estimated 
Completion 
Time 
Units  Acres Acres Rs. Crore Rs. Lakhs Rs. Lakhs Rs. Lakhs Years 
Private 22 91 6.2 2.0 17.4 0.5 125.8 6.2 
APIIC, AP 1 582 36.4 0.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 6.8 
(blank) 21 68 4.8 2.1 18.1 0.5 125.8 6.2 
State 10 170 9.3 1.5 10.3 0.0 36.3 6.9 
APIIC, AP 1 1000 58.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
KIADB, KA 1 48 0.7 1.7 32.7 32.7 32.7 5.9 
MIDC, MH 4 63 1.1 1.5 5.8 4.1 8.0 7.3 
RIICO, RJ 3 53 1.4 2.0 14.6 3.5 36.3 6.9 
SIPCOT, TN 1 248 24.8 0.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 9.1 
Grand Total 32 116 7.2 1.8 15.2 0.0 125.8 6.4 
 
